Drinking Water Protection and Agricultural Exceptionalism by Pollans, Margot J.
Drinking Water Protection and Agricultural 
Exceptionalism 
MARGOT J. POLLANS* 
Providing safe drinking water is a basic responsibility of government. 
In the United States, local water utilities shoulder much of this 
burden, but federal drinking water law sets these utilities up to fail. 
The primary problem arises in the context of nonpoint source 
pollution, where federal drinking water law favors end-of-line clean 
up by water utilities over pollution prevention by farmers and other 
nonpoint source polluters. This system is both inefficient and unfair.  
 
Although the Safe Drinking Water Act requires local utilities to 
provide safe water, it gives them few tools to engage in water 
pollution prevention and instead emphasizes water filtration and 
treatment. At the same time, the Clean Water Act, which regulates 
water pollution, broadly exempts much agricultural water 
contamination and other nonpoint source pollution from its strict 
permitting requirements. As a result of the interaction of these two 
statutes, water utilities are often the first line of defense against 
agricultural water contamination’s many human health harms. 
Allocating cleanup responsibility to water utilities rather than to 
polluters is inefficient because it prioritizes end-of-line clean up even 
where pollution prevention would be less expensive. It also fails to 
account for the ancillary benefits of pollution prevention, including, 
among other things, protection of aquatic habitats. This allocation of 
responsibility is inequitable not only because it has a disparate impact 
on low-income and minority communities, but also because it 
disadvantages communities whose drinking water sources are 
adjacent to farms relative to those whose drinking water sources are 
adjacent to polluters that are subject to the Clean Water Act’s 
permitting requirements. For the former set of communities, legal 
mechanisms to shift either costs or cleanup responsibility to farmers 
are extremely limited. To address these concerns, this Article calls for 
a suite of legal reforms that would shift the default from end of line 
cleanup to pollution prevention by empowering water utilities to 
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adequately protect their source waters and by revoking the special 
status of farms in environmental law.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The drinking water in Des Moines, Iowa just barely meets federal nitrate 
standards.1 According to the city’s 2016 Consumer Confidence Report, “[h]igh 
nitrate levels in drinking water can cause blue baby syndrome,” and consumers 
caring for infants “should ask for advice from [their] healthcare provider[s].”2 
To meet the federal standard, the city uses a variety of techniques, including 
water blending and an expensive ion exchange treatment process.3 In March 
2015, the Des Moines Board of Water Works filed suit against thirteen nearby 
agricultural drainage districts, claiming that their field drainage practices 
contribute to the dangerous levels of nitrate contamination in the city’s sources 
of drinking water.4 In its complaint, the Board explains that it has spent 
millions to protect the public from poisoning, and that, if left unabated, 
ongoing contamination could ultimately cost the city hundreds of millions.5 
Across the United States, agricultural pollution threatens air, water, and 
natural resources, yet it remains the least environmentally regulated industry. 
Despite over forty years of extensive federal regulation of water pollution, 
agricultural waste, most of which enters water as “nonpoint source pollution,” 
remains a significant threat to safe drinking water and aquatic ecosystems.6 
Climate change will only exacerbate this threat, particularly in areas with 
                                                                                                                     
 1 DES MOINES WATER WORKS, 2016 CONSUMER CONFIDENCE REPORT, 
http://www.dmww.com/upl/documents/library/2016ccr.pdf [https://perma.cc/9T9W-749K] 
(showing nitrate levels at some treatment plants as much as 9.4 parts per million; the 
federal standard is 10 parts per million). 
 2 Id.; see also infra notes 89–99 and accompanying text (describing nitrate-related 
health problems and the scope of nitrate contamination in U.S. drinking water supplies). 
 3 DES MOINES WATER WORKS, supra note 1. 
 4 Complaint ¶ 1, Bd. of Water Works Trs. v. Sac Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, No. 5:15-
cv-04020 (N.D. Iowa Mar. 16, 2015) [hereinafter Bd. of Water Works Complaint]. 
 5 Between 1995 and 2005, the Board spent about $3.5 million to operate the nitrate 
removal facility, which it built for $4.1 million in 1992. Id. ¶¶ 94–96. The Board estimates 
that if pollution continues unabated it will need to spend between $76 million and $183.5 
million before 2020 to upgrade and increase the system’s capacity. Id. ¶ 106 (noting that 
any operation and maintenance expenses will be in addition to that capital cost). 
 6 Robin Kundis Craig, Local or National? The Increasing Federalization of Nonpoint 
Source Pollution Regulation, 15 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 179, 181 (2000) (noting growing 
recognition that nonpoint source pollution is a national problem and the only major water 
pollution problem left to solve). Nonpoint source pollution is water pollution that does not 
come from a “discernible, confined and discrete conveyance.” Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1362(14) (2012) (defining “point source”). Nonpoint source contamination—specifically, 
salt runoff from roads—was one of the underlying causes of the Flint, Michigan water 
crisis. Tafline Layline, How Michigan’s Flint River Came to Poison a City, GUARDIAN 
(Jan. 18, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/jan/18/michigan-flint-
river-epa-lead-contamination-mdeq-pollutants-water-safety-health [https://perma.cc/SS3H-
NGKD]. Salt contributed to corrosion in the city’s pipes. Id. 
1198 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 77:6 
increased rainfall and higher water temperatures.7 The Clean Water Act’s 
failure to address these harms is well-documented.8 The Act provides no 
federally enforceable mechanism for mitigating most nonpoint source 
pollution. Many have proposed solutions including radical amendments of the 
statute itself, aggressive state action to fill the gap, and expansion of green 
payment programs, which pay farmers to change their practices to reduce 
water contamination.9 
The Clean Water Act also operates in a complex of federal and state water 
laws pursuing multiple goals, including public health and safety. In particular, 
the Clean Water Act’s failure to address agricultural water pollution must be 
understood as a backdrop to a companion federal statute: the Safe Drinking 
Water Act (SDWA).10 The SDWA requires the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) to set drinking water standards for harmful contaminants, and it 
requires that public water utilities meet those standards either through water 
filtration and treatment or through source water protection.11 The threat to 
urban and rural residential drinking water supplies exemplifies the collision 
between agriculture and the environment.12 
The SDWA is widely attacked, particularly by local government officials, 
as an unfunded mandate imposing excessive, and often unjustified, costs on 
local governments.13 Critics argue that its uniform and risk-averse 
                                                                                                                     
 7 Robert W. Adler, Agriculture and Water Quality: A Climate-Integrated 
Perspective, 37 VT. L. REV. 847, 875 (2013) (explaining that higher water temperatures 
have lower levels of dissolved oxygen and may accumulate increased concentrations of 
nutrients and thus more algal blooms). Areas with increased rainfall and more intense 
storms may have more intense runoff. Id.  
 8 See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 
27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 263, 298–304 (2000). See generally Douglas R. Williams, When 
Voluntary, Incentive-Based Controls Fail: Structuring a Regulatory Response to 
Agricultural Nonpoint Source Water Pollution, 9 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 21 (2002). 
 9 Robert W. Adler, Addressing Barriers to Watershed Protection, 25 ENVTL. L. 973, 
1088–106 (1995); Terence J. Centner, Nutrient Pollution from Land Applications of 
Manure: Discerning a Remedy for Pollution, 21 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 213, 218 (2010); 
John R. Nolon, In Praise of Parochialism: The Advent of Local Environmental Law, 26 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 365, 413–16 (2002); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, 
Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling 
Away, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 59, 110 (2010); Ruhl, supra note 8, at 298–304; David Zaring, 
Note, Agriculture, Nonpoint Source Pollution, and Regulatory Control: The Clean Water 
Act’s Bleak Present and Future, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 515, 524–25 (1996). 
 10 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26 (2012). 
 11 Id. § 300g-1 (mandating that the EPA set national drinking water standards); id. 
§ 300g-2 (delegating primary enforcement authority to the states). Public water utilities are 
utilities that provide water to at least twenty-five people or have at least fifteen service 
connections. Id. § 300f(4). The statutory requirements thus do not apply to wells or to very 
small drinking water systems. 
 12 See infra Part II.B (describing the environmental and human health consequences 
of agricultural water pollution). 
 13 David L. Markell, The Role of Local Governments in Environmental Regulation: 
Shoring Up Our Federal System, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 885, 898–900 (1993) (describing 
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requirements reflect the need to devolve authority to states to engage in more 
location-specific standard setting.14 Proponents argue that the cost and 
complexity of risk assessment combined with the need to provide uniformly 
clean water to all justifies federal intervention.15  
This debate, which focuses on the SDWA in isolation from the Clean 
Water Act, misses the SDWA’s central flaw: that its design ignores extreme 
variation in the Clean Water Act’s pollution prevention obligations. Although 
the Clean Water Act includes nonpoint source pollution programs and the 
SDWA includes sourcewater protection programs, neither statute mandates 
pollution prevention.16 Accordingly, taken together, the Clean Water Act and 
the SDWA assign primary responsibility for nonpoint source contamination of 
drinking water to water utilities. Water utilities have extremely limited 
capacity to prevent contamination of drinking source water. With few options 
at their disposal to mitigate threats to source water, most devote extensive 
resources to water purification, which itself is an imperfect tool to protect the 
public health.17 
The primary claim of this Article is that the failure to regulate nonpoint 
source pollution creates a default in favor of end-of-line purification over 
pollution prevention at the source. This default results in an inefficient and 
inequitable assignment of pollution abatement costs and responsibility. This 
Article calls for a shift in the default from end-of-line cleanup to pollution 
prevention.  
                                                                                                                     
concern that the SDWA fails to prioritize among various risks); Jeffrey Marks, The Role of 
Federal Environmental Mandates in Intergovernmental Relations, 20 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. 
& POL’Y J. 17, 23 (1996) (observing that many local officials have called for increased 
local flexibility in standard setting and explaining that tension arises when federal financial 
support does not keep up with rising compliance costs); Rena I. Steinzor, Unfunded 
Environmental Mandates and the “New (New) Federalism”: Devolution, Revolution, or 
Reform?, 81 MINN. L. REV. 97, 202 (1996) (arguing that the SDWA regulations do not 
allow adequate tailoring to local conditions or adequate assessment of compliance 
feasibility); Scott D. Laufenberg, Note, The Struggle of Cities to Implement the Safe 
Drinking Water Act in the Context of Intergovernmental Relations, 3 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 
495, 499–500 (1998) (observing that the SDWA can be extremely burdensome for 
municipalities adjacent to agricultural communities). 
 14 See, e.g., Steinzor, supra note 13, at 171. The 1996 amendments responded to these 
concerns by allowing water systems to seek variances and exemptions under certain 
circumstances. See infra note 224 (describing those amendments). 
 15 See, e.g., Steinzor, supra note 13, at 140, 171–73 (noting that cities and counties 
identify the SDWA as one of the most expensive federal mandates, but expressing concern 
that “unrestricted devolution of fundamental regulatory decisions to the local level” could 
result in massive inequality in the availability of safe drinking water). 
 16 See, e.g., Adler, supra note 7, at 855–56 (noting that while there are some 
watershed specific success stories, the overall picture is bleak); see also Clean Water Act, 
33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2012); SDWA, 42 U.S.C. § 300g-2. See infra Part II.C for an outline 
of the relevant provisions of both statutes. 
 17 See infra Parts I.A, I.D (describing practices of water utilities). 
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The allocation of responsibility for clean up is inefficient for two reasons. 
First, in some cases, it is less costly to control the source than it is to filter or 
treat at centralized water distribution facilities, particularly where increased 
contamination necessitates building entirely new treatment facilities.18 But, as 
implemented, the SDWA assigns primary responsibility for the provision of 
clean water to municipal and regional water utilities that often have little or no 
control over drinking water sources. In other words, water utilities, which 
build and maintain water delivery infrastructure, are responsible for ensuring 
that water delivered to users meets federal standards. But for many of these 
utilities, sources of water contamination are beyond their jurisdiction. Imagine, 
for instance, a municipal water utility that draws its water from a river only a 
small portion of which lies within the boundaries of that municipality. In most 
instances, neither the utility nor the municipality itself has authority to control 
upstream land uses that threaten the river’s purity.19 For many municipalities 
and water utilities, the transaction costs to take control of source water are 
simply too high.20 These transaction costs may include, among others, 
difficulty identifying sources, lack of political will at the state level to develop 
nonpoint source pollution controls, lack of will among polluters to engage in 
negotiation, or lack of expertise at the public water utility about source control 
options.21 
                                                                                                                     
 18 See, e.g., Mark D. Hoffer, The New York City Watershed Memorandum of 
Agreement: Forging a Partnership to Protect Water Quality, 18 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 17, 
27 (2010); Stephanie Perez, Note and Comment, New York City’s Drinking Water—
Champagne or Beer?, 12 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 859, 863–64 (1995).  
 19 The 1996 amendments to the SDWA acknowledged the importance of source water 
protection and created a mechanism for water utilities to engage in source control as an 
alternative to filtration and treatment. Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996 
(SDWAA), Pub. L. No. 104-182, 110 Stat. 1613 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 42 U.S.C.). Filtration avoidance is available where the utility demonstrates adequate 
ownership or control over the source watershed: “The public water system must 
demonstrate through ownership and/or written agreements with landowners within the 
watershed that it can control all human activities which may have an adverse impact on the 
microbiological quality of the source water.” 40 C.F.R. § 141.71(b)(2)(iii) (2015). 
Filtration avoidance is also a possibility where a utility relies on water from “uninhabited, 
undeveloped watersheds in consolidated ownership, and having control over access to, and 
activities in, those watersheds.” 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(7)(C)(v). 
 20 See infra Part II.D (identifying costs); infra Part III.A.2 (discussing equity concerns 
related to shifting pollution to costs to water utilities). 
 21 Even New York City, one of the best examples of a large urban water system that 
has successfully protected its source waters and does not filter most of its water, would 
likely not be able to achieve the level of source control it now enjoys had it not taken 
significant steps to obtain that control over a century ago. See About Watershed Protection, 
N.Y.C. ENVTL. PROTECTION, http://www.nyc.gov/html/dep/html/watershed_protection/abo 
ut.shtml [https://perma.cc/ZQ5X-BMTR] (discussing New York City’s current watershed 
protection program); New York City Water Supply, N.Y. ST. DEP’T ENVTL. CONSERVATION, 
http://www.dec.ny.gov/lands/25599.html [https://perma.cc/9DDZ-5HBU] (same). In the 
late nineteenth century, the city annexed and protected large swaths of land for watershed 
protection at a time when there was widespread support for this kind of aggressive step to 
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Second, the ancillary benefits of prevention at the source—beyond safer 
drinking water—also sway this cost-benefit analysis. Prevention at the source 
protects aquatic ecosystems, creating benefits for biodiversity, the recreation 
industry, the fishing industry, and for agriculture itself where pollution affects 
sources of irrigation water.22 Agricultural nonpoint source pollution generates 
numerous environmental and human health costs. The SDWA mitigates only 
one of those costs.23 
Allocation of cleanup cost and responsibility to water utilities also 
generates equity concerns. The costs of agricultural pollution abatement, and, 
in particular, of resulting unclean drinking water, can fall disproportionately 
on poor and minority communities.24 Many low-income families, particularly 
in rural areas, ultimately pay far more for water than what the EPA has 
deemed to be an affordable amount. Further, purification costs fall 
disproportionately on users in small water systems, which are often in low-
income rural areas.25 
In addition to being unfair, the cost assignment is also arbitrary in that the 
extent to which a water utility provides the first line of defense or merely end-
of-line finishing cleanup depends on the nature of the pollution source.26 
Those within the direct ambit of agricultural water pollution must take on this 
extra cost; utilities outside that ambit need not. This concern is a more specific 
variation of the general concern that the SDWA imposes uniform standards on 
utilities facing highly variable compliance costs.27 
                                                                                                                     
protect the city’s economic competitiveness, and with little resistance from the surrounding 
territories. See generally MATTHEW GANDY, CONCRETE AND CLAY: REWORKING NATURE IN 
NEW YORK CITY 18–23 (2003) (retelling the history of New York City’s water 
infrastructure and the political context that made its development possible). Given changed 
political circumstances, this model would be difficult, if not impossible, to replicate today. 
 22 See MARC O. RIBAUDO ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., AER-782, ECONOMICS OF 
WATER QUALITY PROTECTION FROM NONPOINT SOURCES: THEORY AND PRACTICE 3–25 
(Nov. 1999), http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/1385896/aer782.pdf [https://perma.cc/78FZ-
3SLC]. 
 23 See infra Part III.A.1. 
 24 See infra Part III.A.2. 
 25 See infra Part III.A.2. 
 26 Of course, other factors affect the scope of cleanup necessary to meet SDWA 
standards. A utility whose source water has many point sources may face a larger burden 
than one with fewer, even if all those sources are complying with their Clean Water Act 
obligations. Likewise, a utility that relies heavily on groundwater, which is generally not 
directly policed under the Clean Water Act, may face similar problems, particularly in 
regions with fracking. See infra notes 139–41 and accompanying text (discussing SDWA 
treatment of underground injection); see also JAMES SALZMAN, DRINKING WATER 127–31 
(2013) (describing the threat of fracking). 
 27 In the context of the SDWA, proponents of less uniform regulations believe that the 
statute imposes costly obligations whether or not they are relevant to different regions. 
Steinzor, supra note 13, at 140. Some also believe that localities should have the leeway to 
opt for lower safety standards if that is their preference. Id. at 202–03. Indeed, this is a 
standard critique of many types of uniform federal regulations. See, e.g., NICOLE V. CRAIN 
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What is different and particularly troublesome here is that the variation 
stems from underlying disparate application of the polluter pays principle. 
Because a large category of polluters are not responsible for the costs of the 
water pollution they cause, a subset of water utilities are saddled with extra 
costs.28 Ratepayers ultimately bear the burden of this arbitrary allocation of 
costs.29 Although there is some federal and state financial assistance, a 
substantial portion of increased compliance costs fall to water users.30 
Of the nearly ninety pollutants for which the EPA sets SDWA standards, 
at least twenty-four enter waterways through agricultural nonpoint source 
pollution.31 The list includes pesticides, herbicides, nitrates, and microbial 
contaminants from animal waste.32 Without upstream source controls, water 
utilities must engage in burdensome cleanup in order to meet SDWA 
                                                                                                                     
& W. MARK CRAIN, SMALL BUS. ADMIN., THE IMPACT OF REGULATORY COSTS ON SMALL 
FIRMS 7 (Sept. 2010), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/advocacy/The%20Impact%20 
of%20Regulatory%20Costs%20on%20Small%20Firms%20(Full)_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
Y46E-2NRL] (discussing the disproportionate distribution of federal regulatory costs 
among different firm sizes). 
 28 The same concern exists for all categories of unregulated nonpoint source pollution. 
I focus on this context because agricultural nonpoint source pollution remains one of the 
single most significant threats to water in this country. A deep dive into its particular 
consequences for drinking water sharpens existing challenges to the regulatory scheme that 
exempts it. Further, agricultural water pollution merits special attention because of the 
comprehensive nature of agriculture’s regulatory exemptions. See infra Part II.C 
(describing how those exemptions function in the water context). 
 29 Cost uniformity is not an express goal of either the Clean Water Act or SDWA. 
But, to the extent that water is a necessity and ratepayers cover water purification costs, 
significant disparities in cost can raise equity concerns. 
 30 See infra Part II.A (identifying water utility funding sources); see also, e.g., 
Funding Sources, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/rulesre 
gs/sdwa/arsenic/funding.cfm [https://perma.cc/AG9S-PHE2] (last updated Mar. 6, 2012). 
Rate increases also depend on the size of a water district. A 1990s EPA study on water 
utility financial capacity revealed that for large systems, compliance required increasing 
average annual rates by about $3 per household; for smaller systems, the average increase 
was $145. Steinzor, supra note 13, at 208–09.  
 31 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 816-F-09-004, NATIONAL PRIMARY DRINKING 
WATER REGULATIONS (May 2009), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-
06/documents/npwdr_complete_table.pdf [https://perma.cc/56SK-P8RL]. The twenty-four 
pollutants are those identified by the EPA as entering drinking water from agricultural-
related runoff. See id. The Environmental Working Group (EWG) identifies a total of 
ninety-seven agricultural-related contaminants in drinking water. National Drinking Water 
Database: Drinking Water Pollution Has Many Sources, ENVTL. WORKING GROUP (Dec. 
2009), http://www.ewg.org/tap-water/sourcesofwaterpollution.php [https://perma.cc/WBK6 
-RXJZ]. Of these, thirty-five are regulated. Id. For those thirty-five, EWG found that 127 
million people had been exposed to levels exceeding EPA guidelines. Id.; see also Ronald 
Munger et al., Intrauterine Growth Retardation in Iowa Communities with Herbicide-
Contaminated Drinking Water Supplies, 105 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 308, 310 (1997) 
(discussing pesticide contamination in humans). 
 32 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 31. 
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standards.33 Nonpoint source pollution remains the most serious threat to 
water.34 A focus on its threat to drinking water in particular provides 
additional support to calls for more robust regulation35 and for a dismantling 
of agricultural exceptionalism—the notion that farms merit special regulatory 
treatment.36 
The dynamic between the SDWA and the Clean Water Act highlights the 
need for a systems approach to thinking about environmental regulation of the 
food system.37 Water is an environmental system in a physical space. It feeds 
farms (as irrigation water), it collects their pollution (from irrigation and 
stormwater runoff), and it feeds municipalities (as drinking water). This 
system crosses political jurisdictions. A regulatory system that creates 
antagonism across jurisdictions makes this physical system more difficult to 
manage.38  
In the long run, particularly if predictions are correct that climate change 
will exacerbate the risk of drinking water contamination from agricultural 
pollutants, the dynamic described in the preceding paragraphs could serve as 
                                                                                                                     
 33 For instance, following a cryptosporidium outbreak in 1993, Milwaukee Water 
Works invested $89 million for capital improvements to its water filtration systems. Don 
Behm, Milwaukee Marks 20 Years Since Cryptosporidium Outbreak: City Water Remains 
Free of Parasite, Frequent Testing Shows, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Apr. 6, 2013), 
http://www.jsonline.com/news/milwaukee/milwaukee-marks-20-years-since-cryptosporidi 
um-outbreak-099dio5-201783191.html [https://perma.cc/24E9-KNAU]; see also supra 
notes 28–31 and accompanying text (discussing the potential for water utilities to engage in 
source control); infra Part II.D (discussing costs of agricultural pollution of drinking water 
supplies). 
 34 According to the most recent National Water Quality Inventory, agriculture is the 
leading cause of contamination of rivers and streams, affecting 40% of impaired river and 
stream miles. OFFICE OF WETLANDS, OCEANS & WATERSHEDS, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, A NATIONAL EVALUATION OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT SECTION 319 PROGRAM 5, 
11 (Nov. 2011), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-09/documents/319evaluat 
ion.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XWV-AFYZ].  
 35 See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text. Of course, much agricultural 
contamination ends up in waters that are not drinking source waters. The arguments this 
Article offers for more robust regulation of farm pollution do not apply in those contexts. 
 36 See infra Part II.C and note 114 (describing agricultural exceptionalism in context 
of federal water quality law); infra note 191 and accompanying text (defining agricultural 
exceptionalism in more detail); infra Part III.B (considering when it is appropriate to 
allocate a farm’s pollution control costs to water utilities).  
 37 See, e.g., Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 
54 DUKE L.J. 795, 795–96 (2005) (calling for “a high degree of flexible coordination across 
government agencies as well as between public agencies and private actors” to allow for 
creative and bigger-picture problem solving). 
 38 Many scholars have recognized the mismatch between environmental systems and 
political systems and have considered how political systems should approach 
environmental regulation in light of both this fact and the fact that environmental systems 
themselves are extraordinarily complex. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental 
Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How to Clean Up the Environment by Making a Mess 
of Environmental Law, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 933, 981–82 (1997). 
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an important catalyst for change.39 As filtration and treatment costs rise for 
municipalities, water utilities and the state agencies overseeing them will 
continue to seek alternate approaches, including using litigation to reallocate 
mitigation costs from municipal ratepayers to farmers.40 They may also put 
pressure on state governments to develop more comprehensive nonpoint 
source pollution regulatory programs. Public support for such efforts may also 
increase in response to high salience contamination events. In Iowa, for 
instance, 60% of residents support the Des Moines Water Works lawsuit.41 In 
other words, this type of extremely costly and public pollution in urban areas 
creates a constituency for environmental regulation of agriculture that may not 
have existed before. 
Access to safe drinking water is nearly ubiquitous in this country. Efficient 
(as in welfare maximizing) and equitable preservation of this resource requires 
reconciliation of the various statutory schemes that govern the resource and 
the various political jurisdictions that manage it. Reforms to the Clean Water 
Act itself could go a long way toward solving this problem. A more 
comprehensive solution would also shift the SDWA away from its 
technocratic emphasis on end-of-line filtration and treatment and toward a 
systems management approach. 
Part II provides an overview of the relationship between modern 
agriculture and the public water supply, describing both water contamination 
costs and the statutory background governing agricultural water pollution. It 
argues that through their interaction, the SDWA and Clean Water Act allocate 
nonpoint source pollution cleanup costs to water utilities, and it describes how 
utilities pay these costs. Part III argues that this legal structure misallocates 
water pollution cleanup responsibility and costs, putting too much burden on 
water utilities and ratepayers. It explores a range of arguments in favor of 
reallocating this burden. It also argues that the scheme’s preference for end-of-
line cleanup over pollution mitigation is misguided regardless of where the 
costs fall. Part IV considers various solutions for making source-water 
protection the norm rather than the alternative. It first considers existing 
litigation options and concludes that these mechanisms are inadequate 
because, while they can provide relief in certain narrow circumstances, they 
offer only a piecemeal approach. It then also considers various potential legal 
reforms. A final Part briefly concludes. 
                                                                                                                     
 39 See Adler, supra note 7, at 875 (describing the potential effects of climate change 
on drinking water). 
 40 See infra Part IV.A (exploring options utilities might use under current law to shift 
costs and cleanup obligations to farmers). 
 41 Donelle Eller, Iowans Support Water Lawsuit, but Split on Who Should Pay, DES 
MOINES REG. (Feb. 27, 2016), http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/money/agriculture/ 
2016/02/27/iowa-poll-iowans-support-water-lawsuit-but-split-who-should-pay/80938460/ 
[https://perma.cc/K74Q-ZGAB] (reporting on a poll surveying support for the lawsuit and 
finding high levels of support in urban areas, as high as 65%, and finding that even in rural 
areas support, at 49%, exceeded disapproval, at 42%). 
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II. AGRICULTURE AND DRINKING WATER: THE PHYSICAL CONNECTION 
Drinking water faces numerous threats. Common contaminants include 
perchlorate (rocket fuel), arsenic from mining and other industrial processes, 
trihalomethanes and halocetic acids, both by-products of water chlorination, 
and lead from aging pipes and faucets.42 Agricultural nonpoint source 
pollution contains a variety of additional contaminants that threaten public 
health and increase the costs of safe water delivery across the country.43 
Although all of these pollutants pose serious risk, this Article focuses solely on 
the latter, considering the interaction between safe drinking water regulation 
and agricultural regulation.44  
This Part begins with a brief overview of water utilities, their general 
practices and their sources of income. It then describes current nonpoint source 
pollution drinking water risks, highlighting the dependency of residential and 
urban areas on their rural hinterlands. Against a backdrop of agriculture’s 
environmental regulatory vacuum, this pollution poses significant costs for 
ecosystems, drinking water systems, ratepayers, and, ultimately, taxpayers.  
A. Water Utilities: Economics and Practices 
The SDWA’s requirements apply to public water utilities, which are 
utilities (both publicly and privately owned) that provide at least fifteen 
service connections or serve at least twenty-five people.45 According to the 
Congressional Research Service, there are approximately 152,700 such water 
systems.46 These systems fall into three categories: community water systems, 
which serve the same residents year round; non-transient non-community 
water systems, which include schools, factories, and other institutions that 
have their own water supplies and serve the same individuals for more than six 
months but not year round; and transient non-community water systems, 
                                                                                                                     
 42 ERIK OLSON, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL, WHAT’S ON TAP? GRADING DRINKING 
WATER IN U.S. CITIES 44–67 (June 2003), 
http://www.nrdc.org/water/drinking/uscities/pdf/whatsontap.pdf [https://perma.cc/92ZY-
7TA4]. 
 43 Id. 
 44 See supra note 28 (explaining this choice). 
 45 42 U.S.C. § 300f(4) (2012). Although there are some privately owned or privately 
managed water systems, the majority are public. OLSON, supra note 42, at 6. Water law 
scholar Tony Arnold has argued that privatization of water systems, as one aspect of 
privatization of water resources, threatens both the human right to water and national 
security. Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Water Privatization Trends in the United States: 
Human Rights, National Security, and Public Stewardship, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 785, 789 (2009) (calling for legislation to limit private control and to develop 
“comprehensive principles of public stewardship of water resources to support human life 
and national security”). 
 46 MARY TIEMANN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31243, SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT 
(SDWA): A SUMMARY OF THE ACT AND ITS MAJOR REQUIREMENTS 3 (2014).  
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which provide water to transitory customers.47 Campgrounds and gas stations 
fall into this last category.48  
The vast majority of these water systems are extremely small. Of the 
51,350 community water systems, 82% serve fewer than 3,300 people.49 
Likewise, of the 101,400 non-community water systems (including both the 
transient and non-transient systems), about 95,700 serve fewer than 500 
people.50 Nevertheless, most Americans receive water from a small subset of 
large regional and urban water systems. Eight percent of community water 
systems serve over 10,000 people, and, in total, provide water to about 246 
million Americans.51 
How do these water systems, particularly the smaller ones, pay for 
compliance? Water utilities have four main tools to cover capital and operating 
costs: (1) user fees, (2) other local funding sources, (3) debt and equity, and 
(4) grants and loans from state and federal agencies. 
According to the 2002 Government Accountability Office Study, about 
39% of drinking water utilities cover costs of providing service through user 
fees alone, and 71% cover operating costs through a combination of user fees 
and other local fees.52 Local fees include, among others, property taxes, sales 
to other utilities, and hook up and connection fees.53 Looking only at operation 
and maintenance costs, about 85% of drinking water utilities cover their costs 
through user fees alone, and including other local funding, the number reaches 
93%.54 
Many water utilities also turn to federal and state funding sources, which 
include both loans and grants. The SDWA itself authorizes funding to both 
states and public water systems.55 The Drinking Water State Revolving Fund 
                                                                                                                     
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-764, WATER INFRASTRUCTURE: 
INFORMATION ON FINANCING, CAPITAL PLANNING, AND PRIVATIZATION 2, 6 (2002). Costs 
of providing service include both annual operating costs and capital costs. Id. at 21. This 
report also found that utility size (measured as size of population served) had no bearing on 
whether or not the utility was able to cover costs through user fees and other local revenue 
sources. Id. at 24. The report did find, however, that publicly owned drinking water utilities 
were less likely than privately owned utilities to cover costs. Id. (finding that that 38% of 
public utilities cover costs and 56% of private utilities cover costs). 
 53 Id. at 23. 
 54 Id. at 27. 
 55 State agencies with primacy are also eligible for federal grant funding to support 
development and implementation of state drinking water regulations, monitoring, 
reporting, and enforcement. 42 U.S.C. § 300j-2(a) (2012). Federal funding covers about 
35% of federal water program implementation costs; this includes the costs states incur 
developing regulations and enforcing those regulations, but not the costs incurred by local 
utilities to provide water and comply with state and federal regulation. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
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provides grants for infrastructure improvements, and emphasizes support for 
small and disadvantaged communities.56 Grant recipients include nonprofit 
organizations, tribal governments, states, municipalities, state institutions of 
higher learning, interstate organizations, and special water districts.57 States 
are allowed to set aside a maximum of 31% of their grants “to develop and 
implement programs that encourage better drinking water systems operation to 
ensure a safer supply of water for the public,” and about half of that money 
can be spent on “activities devoted to protecting drinking water sources from 
contamination.”58 States use these funds for purchasing easements around 
drinking water sources and conducting source water delineations and 
assessments.59 
States also receive support from the Clean Water State Revolving Fund, 
which was authorized by the 1987 Clean Water Act amendments and serves 
primarily to assist communities with developing adequate wastewater 
treatment.60 As of 1991, eighteen states were using some portion of this federal 
funding to address nonpoint source pollution.61 For fiscal year 1998, $96.3 
million was spent on nonpoint source pollution.62  
The majority of funding is local.63 Costs are borne by water users.64 But 
state and federal funding tools help offset costs, particularly for smaller 
utilities.65 Where a water system does not encompass an entire watershed, 
these fundraising tools may reduce the incentive for utilities to engage in 
source water protection unless they can collaborate successfully with 
                                                                                                                     
AGENCY, EPA 816-F-04-038, DRINKING WATER COSTS & FEDERAL FUNDING (June 2004), 
http://www.nesc.wvu.edu/WVWSET/resources/File_04_DWFSFN36.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/7D6N-8BU7]. 
 56 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 55. 
 57 See Grant Awards Database, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/oarm/igms_egf.nsf/allgrantsnarrow?SearchView&Query=SDWA&
SearchOrder=1&SearchMax=&SearchWV=false&SearchFuzzy=false&Start=1&Count=500 
[https://perma.cc/5CT4-842B] (last updated Aug. 10, 2016) (categorizing by grant number, 
recipient, project title, recipient type, and cumulative award amount). Over 70% of grants 
go directly to states, which in turn loan or grant money to water utilities and provide 
matching funds. Id. 
 58 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/RCED-99-45, WATER QUALITY: 
FEDERAL ROLE IN ADDRESSING—AND CONTRIBUTING TO—NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION 
31 (1999). When this report was written, the EPA’s stated goal was to increase the 
percentage of Revolving Fund money spent on nonpoint source pollution to 10%. Id. at 29. 
 59 In fiscal years 1994 to 1998, $111.8 million was obligated to these activities. Id. at 
27–31. 
 60 Id. at 28. 
 61 Id. at 29. 
 62 Id. (in 1999 dollars). 
 63 On average, states and localities contribute 65% of the funding and the federal 
government contributes the remaining 35%. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 55. 
 64 See id. 
 65 See id. 
1208 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 77:6 
neighboring utilities to share the cost. Limited funding also incentivizes 
utilities to prioritize immediate compliance over long-term planning. 
B. Agricultural Pollution in Drinking Water 
Agricultural pollution regularly contaminates drinking water sources in 
both rural and urban areas. In California, for instance, agricultural 
contaminants are responsible for about three-quarters of all water 
impairment.66 Nationally, precise data is lacking, but according to the U.S. 
Geological Survey, “71 percent of U.S. cropland (nearly 300 million acres) is 
located in watersheds where the concentration of at least one of four common 
surface–water contaminants (nitrate, phosphorous, fecal coliform bacteria, and 
suspended sediment) exceeded criteria for supporting water-based recreation 
activities.”67 Agricultural pollutants—including pesticides, manure, synthetic 
fertilizer, antibiotics, and particulate matter—enter water sources through a 
variety of pathways. The three most significant are surface water runoff, 
ground water infiltration, and atmospheric deposition.68 Through each of these 
mechanisms, contaminants can travel great distances. For instance, manure 
runoff in the upper Mississippi River basin, coming from farms in Wisconsin 
and Minnesota, can end up in the Gulf of Mexico, well over a thousand miles 
away.69 One study estimated that as much as 15% of the nitrogen fertilizer and 
3% of the pesticides applied to cropland throughout the Mississippi River 
Basin end up in the Gulf.70 Contaminants pollute both surface water—the 
source of about 63% of drinking water—and groundwater.71 The analysis in 
                                                                                                                     
 66 ERIC OLSON, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL, WHAT’S ON TAP? GRADING DRINKING 
WATER IN U.S. CITIES (EARLY RELEASE CALIFORNIA EDITION) 51 (Oct. 2002), 
http://www.nrdc.org/water/drinking/uscities/pdf/whatsontap_ca.pdf [https://perma.cc/MT3 
U-4L4G]. 
 67 RIBAUDO ET AL., supra note 22, at iv. 
 68 Id. at 7 (discussing how groundwater infiltration can result either by run-in of 
chemicals directly to groundwater from sinkholes, porous bedrock, or poorly constructed 
wells, or by leaching, whereby percolating rain or irrigation water carries pollutants 
through soil). 
 69 See, e.g., JON DEVINE, MARK DORFMAN & KIRSTEN SINCLAIR ROSSELOT, NAT. RES. 
DEF. COUNCIL, MISSING PROTECTION: POLLUTING THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER BASIN’S SMALL 
STREAMS AND WETLANDS 4 (Oct. 2008), https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/msriver.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H8SY-GGQY]. 
 70 RIBAUDO ET AL., supra note 22, at 6. 
 71 In 1999, 114 million people (out of a total population of 306 million) received 
drinking water from a public water system relying on groundwater. Erika K. Wallender et 
al., Contributing Factors to Disease Outbreaks Associated with Untreated Groundwater, 
52 GROUND WATER 886, 886 (2014). Note, however, that the percentage of water drinkers 
relying on surface water is actually slightly lower as this calculation excludes the 15.8 
million wells, not governed by the SDWA, that each serve one to five households. Id. 
Seventy-seven percent of community water systems rely on groundwater. TIEMANN, supra 
note 46, at 3. 
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this Article focuses primarily on the former, except to the extent that 
groundwater has a close hydrologic connection to surface water.72  
Fertilizers, including both synthetic fertilizers and manure, pose serious 
problems for drinking water when they collect in off-farm waterways such as 
lakes. Overabundance of fertilizers, known as eutrophication, can generate 
algal blooms, which in turn lead to hypoxia, the depletion of subsurface 
oxygen.73 Without oxygen, aquatic life below algal blooms cannot survive, 
thus hypoxia creates often-massive aquatic dead zones.74 In 2015, the dead 
zone in the Gulf of Mexico, which collects runoff from the entire Missouri and 
Mississippi River basins, was larger than the states of Connecticut and Rhode 
Island combined.75 Loss of aquatic life affects biodiversity and has collateral 
consequences for commercial and recreational fishing.76 Eutrophication is 
often also associated with increased turbidity and surface plant accumulation, 
which both might reduce a body of water’s recreational value.77 
Eutrophication also poses a significant threat to drinking water. Certain 
species of algae, cyanobacteria or blue-green algae, can produce a variety of 
toxins that can affect respiratory, digestive, nervous, and cutaneous systems.78 
Acute symptoms range from headaches, fever, muscle and joint pain, stomach 
cramps, vomiting, and diarrhea.79 More severe effects may include liver 
failure, seizures, and respiratory arrest.80 When eutrophication occurs in 
                                                                                                                     
 72 For instance, in the Des Moines case, the plaintiffs claim that their surface water 
drinking water supply is contaminated by groundwater. Bd. of Water Works Complaint, 
supra note 4, ¶¶ 4, 9. 
 73 DAVID K. MUELLER & DENNIS R. HELSEL, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, U.S. 
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, CIRCULAR 1136, NUTRIENTS IN THE NATION’S WATERS—TOO MUCH 
OF A GOOD THING? 2 (1996), http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/1996/1136/report.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/F8ZA-BQFW]. As algae decomposes it absorbs oxygen. Id.  
 74 Id. 
 75 2015 Gulf of Mexico Dead Zone ‘Above Average,’ NOAA (Aug. 4, 2015), 
http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2015/080415-gulf-of-mexico-dead-zone-above-aver 
age.html [https://perma.cc/R7BB-VCMA]. 
 76 Id. 
 77 See generally 3 U.N. Env’t Programme-Int’l Env’t Tech. Ctr. & Int’l Lake Env’t 
Comm. Found., Lakes and Reservoirs: Water Quality: The Impact of Eutrophication 4 
(2001), http://www.ilec.or.jp/en/wp/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Vol.3.pdf [https://perma.c 
c/3S83-G9FX]. 
 78 REG’L OFFICE FOR EUR., WORLD HEALTH ORG., EUTROPHICATION AND HEALTH 
(2002), http://ec.europa.eu/environment/water/water-nitrates/pdf/eutrophication.pdf [https:/ 
/perma.cc/Z2WF-4JYU]. Cyanobacteria are primarily hepatotoxins (affecting the liver), 
anatoxins (primarily neurotoxins), and cylindrospermopsins (also hepatotoxins). 
Cyanobacteria/Cyanotoxins, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www2.epa.gov/nutri 
nt-policy-data/cyanobacteriacyanotoxins [https://perma.cc/8DRW-MQ4D] (last updated 
June 29, 2016). 
 79 OFFICE OF WATER, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 810F11001, CYANOBACTERIA 
AND CYANOTOXINS: INFORMATION FOR DRINKING WATER SYSTEMS (Sept. 2014), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201408/documents/cyanobacteria_factsheet.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6UM4-CEA9]. 
 80 Id.  
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drinking water sources, these contaminants can enter the systems at levels 
exceeding the treatment and filtration capacities of water utilities. For instance, 
on August 2, 2014, the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency issued a do not 
drink warning for the City of Toledo, when an algal bloom occurred directly 
on top of the city’s drinking water intake in Lake Erie, contaminating the Ohio 
city’s tap water with the cyanobacteria microcystin,81 a toxin that can cause 
diarrhea, vomiting, and abnormal liver function.82 High levels of agricultural 
fertilizers and animal waste caused the algal bloom.83 Compounding the public 
health problem, microcystin cannot be eliminated by boiling, so for three days, 
Toledo residents drank only bottled water.84 
Despite the threat of cyanotoxins, the EPA has not set drinking water 
standards for these contaminants. Instead, the Agency includes them on its 
“Candidate Contaminant List,” an inventory of contaminants that are known to 
occur in U.S. waters and may pose a threat to drinking water.85 The EPA 
publishes recommendations for testing for, treating, and filtering 
cyanotoxins.86 Because there are no national drinking water standards, 
national level data on cyanotoxin outbreaks is spotty, but a recent study of a 
two-year period in New York, Ohio, and Washington found eleven outbreaks 
and sixty-one illnesses resulting from freshwater lake algal-blooms.87 A 
number of states have established their own cyanotoxin standards.88 
                                                                                                                     
 81 Codi Kozacek, Seven Ohio Drinking Water Sources Don’t Meet State Water 
Quality Standards for Toxic Algae, CIRCLE BLUE (Aug. 25, 2014), 
http://www.circleofblue.org/waternews/2014/world/seven-ohio-drinking-water-sources-do 
nt-meet-state-water-quality-standards-toxic-algae/ [https://perma.cc/3VEA-PVU4]. 
 82 See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text. 
 83 Kozacek, supra note 81. 
 84 Tom Philpott, The Big-Ag-Fueled Algae Bloom that Won’t Leave Toledo’s Water 
Supply Alone, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.motherjones.com/tom-
philpott/2015/08/giant-toxic-algae-bloom-haunts-toledo [https://perma.cc/4N7G-ZZQU]. 
In public emergencies such as this, bottled water is sometimes provided free of charge from 
government agencies and nonprofits, but residents often end up paying for bottled water 
themselves, and this water can cost from 240 to 10,000 times more than tap water per 
gallon. OLSON, supra note 42, at 11. 
 85 OFFICE OF WATER, supra note 79. The EPA’s failure to set cyanotoxin standards 
provides fodder for the common charge that the biggest failing of the SDWA is not 
compliance but rather lax standards. See, e.g., OLSON, supra note 42, at vii. 
 86 The EPA also maintains health advisories for cyanotoxins, recommending safe 
levels at or below 0.3 micrograms per liter for microcystins and 0.7 micrograms per liter 
for cylindrospermopsin for children less than six, and levels of 1.6 micrograms per liters 
and 3.0 micrograms per liter for older children and adults respectively. OFFICE OF WATER, 
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 820F15003, 2015 DRINKING WATER HEALTH 
ADVISORIES FOR TWO CYANOBACTERIAL TOXINS (June 2015), http://www.epa.gov/sites/pro 
duction/files/2015-06/documents/cyanotoxins-fact_sheet-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/RRE9 
-Z2PE]. 
 87 Timothy G. Otten & Hans W. Pearl, Health Effects of Toxic Cyanobacteria in U.S. 
Drinking and Recreational Waters: Our Current Understanding and Proposed Direction, 2 
CURRENT ENVTL. HEALTH REP. 75, 76 (2015) (citing E.D. Hillborn et al., Algal Bloom-
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An ingredient common in both synthetic fertilizers and manure, nitrates 
pose particular concern to drinking water.89 The EPA-established nitrate 
maximum contaminant level is ten milligrams per liter, which is the standard 
requisite to protect infants against methemeoloinemia, also known as “blue 
baby syndrome.”90 The disorder is most common among infants and can be 
fatal.91 It reduces the ability of blood to carry oxygen; the lack of oxygen may 
lead to bluish-colored skin.92 Other symptoms may include difficulty 
breathing, hypotension, developmental delays, and below-average weight 
gain.93 Children may also experience ill effects from consuming nitrate-
contaminated water.94 They are at a higher risk of developing respiratory tract 
infections and goiter.95 Nitrate contamination also poses a risk for pregnant 
women.96  
Nitrate-contaminated drinking water is common in intensive agricultural 
areas. For instance, in the San Joaquin Valley in Central California between 
2005 and 2008, ninety-two drinking water systems had nitrate levels 
exceeding EPA standards.97 Nationally, reported violations of EPA standards 
                                                                                                                     
Associated Disease Outbreaks Among Users of Freshwater Lakes—United States, 2009-
2010, 63 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 11 (2014)). 
 88 In 2014, the Association of State Drinking Water Administrators conducted a 
survey finding that seven states had drinking water advisory thresholds for cyanotxins, five 
states had response programs, four states had draft policies, and eight states were 
considering drafting policies. ASS’N OF STATE DRINKING WATER ADM’RS, DRINKING 
WATER HARMFUL ALGAL BLOOM (HAB) SURVEY: SUMMARY OF RESPONSES (COLLECTED 
IN APRIL 2014) 2, 7 (Aug. 2014), http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-
09/documents/asdwa_drinking_water_hab_survey_summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/6PZC-
C59S]; see also H. Kenneth Hudnell et al., United States of America: Historical Review 
and Current Policy Addressing Cyanobacteria, in CURRENT APPROACHES TO CYANOTOXIN 
RISK ASSESSMENT, RISK MANAGEMENT AND REGULATIONS IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES 137, 
141–44 (Ingrid Chorus ed., 2012), http://www.umweltbundesamt.de/sites/default/files/medi 
en/461/publikationen/4390.pdf [https://perma.cc/27YW-SULT]. 
 89 OLSON, supra note 66, at 52 (explaining that nitrate contamination follows both 
from direct application of fertilizers and from concentrated animal feeding operations). 
 90 ELI MOORE & EYAL MATALON, PAC. INST., THE HUMAN COSTS OF NITRATE-
CONTAMINATED DRINKING WATER IN THE SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY 9, 12 (Mar. 2011), 
http://www.pacinst.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/21/2013/02/nitrate_contamination3.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XVS9-VCGH]. 
 91 Water Sanitation Health: Water-Related Diseases, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/diseases/methaemoglob/en/ [https://perma.cc/ 
GW7J-6GMQ].  
 92 Id.  
 93 PHYSICIANS FOR SOC. RESPONSIBILITY, DRINKING WATER FACT SHEET #9: NITRATE, 
http://www.psr.org/assets/pdfs/nitrate.pdf [https://perma.cc/E4YY-3CZJ]. 
 94 Id.  
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
 97 MOORE & MATALON, supra note 90, at 9.  
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have ranged between 517 and 1,163 per year (between 1998 and 2008).98 
According to the U.S. Geological Survey, nitrate contamination in 
groundwater is highest in areas of well-drained soils and intensive cultivation 
of row crops, such as corn, cotton, or vegetables, and contamination in surface 
water is highest in areas downstream of agricultural or urban areas.99 
Manure, which is a common source of excessive nitrates and other 
nutrients,100 is also a risk factor for microbial pathogens such as 
cryptosporidium.101 Cryptosporidium can cause severe diarrhea, nausea, 
abdominal cramps, and fever and poses particular risks for those with 
weakened immune systems, including children, the elderly, and those living 
with HIV/AIDS.102 There is no known antibiotic or other medical treatment 
that can kill this organism, and it is known to survive both boiling and dousing 
with pure chlorine.103 In 1993, an outbreak in Milwaukee, Wisconsin killed 
about 100 people.104 Cryptosporidium is found in 80% of U.S. surface waters 
tested, but because of poor testing technology, no negative tests can be treated 
as definitive.105 
Pharmaceuticals used in animal agriculture also threaten the drinking 
water supply. Between 25% and 75% of antibiotics fed to farm animals are 
excreted unchanged and enter waterways through groundwater contamination, 
overflow of waste lagoons into surface water, and over-application of manure 
as fertilizer in farm fields.106 The abundance of low levels of antibiotics can 
contribute to proliferance of antibiotic-resistant strains of bacteria.107 Steroids 
are used in animal agriculture to promote muscle growth, and the most 
commonly used steroid is trebolone acetate, a male sex hormone mimic.108 
                                                                                                                     
 98 STATE-EPA NUTRIENT INNOVATIONS TASK GRP., AN URGENT CALL TO ACTION: 
REPORT OF THE STATE-EPA NUTRIENT INNOVATIONS TASK GROUP 3 (Aug. 2009), 
http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/nitgreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/73GE 
-HY8P]. The total number of people affected per year ranged from 200,000 to 1.9 million. 
Id. 
 99 MUELLER & HELSEL, supra note 73, at 1. 
 100 OLSON, supra note 42, at 52–53. 
 101 Id. at 44. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. at 44–45. 
 105 Id. at 45. 
 106 MAE WU ET AL., NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL, DOSED WITHOUT PRESCRIPTION: 
PREVENTING PHARMACEUTICAL CONTAMINATION OF OUR NATION’S DRINKING WATER 32 
(Dec. 2009), https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/hea_10012001a.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
2GEZ-V57K]. Antibiotics are used both for growth promotion and for disease prevention. 
DENNIS P. FINNEGAN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATIONS 
REPORT 2010–5083, OCCURRENCE OF ANTIBIOTIC COMPOUNDS IN SOURCE WATER AND 
FINISHED DRINKING WATER FROM THE UPPER SCIOTO RIVER BASIN, OHIO, 2005–6, at 2 
(2010), http://pubs.usgs.gov/sir/2010/5083/pdf/sir2010-5083.pdf [https://perma.cc/FK6W-
GN6B]. 
 107 MAE WU ET AL., supra note 106, at 5. 
 108 Id. 
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Exposure to this hormone, even at very low levels, can interfere with human 
sex hormone levels and “with other hormonal systems including the thyroid 
gland, which is critical for proper growth and development of the brain during 
fetal growth, infancy, and childhood.”109  
Finally, agricultural pesticides, many of which are regulated under 
SDWA, also contaminate drinking water. The Natural Resources Defense 
Council estimates that about one million Americans per year are exposed, 
through their drinking water, to the commonly used herbicide atrazine.110 
Atrazine is widely used for corn, and it enters drinking water sources both 
through agricultural runoff and through rain.111 Atrazine is a carcinogen and 
an endocrine disrupter.112 It is found in drinking water throughout the 
Mississippi River basin and in other corn growing regions and is also a 
contaminant of “some concern” in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and New 
Orleans, Louisiana.113 
C. Clean Up Responsibility 
Farms are not subject to the primary mechanisms of the Clean Water Act. 
Indeed, as thoroughly documented by J.B. Ruhl, farms are subject to very little 
traditional environmental regulation.114 In most instances, farms are under no 
                                                                                                                     
 109 Id. Agriculture is, of course, one of many sources of pharmaceuticals in drinking 
water. See generally WORLD HEALTH ORG., WHO/HSE/WSH/11.05, PHARMACEUTICALS IN 
DRINKING-WATER (2011), http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/publications/2011/ 
pharmaceuticals_20110601.pdf [https://perma.cc/WTZ9-2U5Y] (describing the problem 
more generally). 
 110 OLSON, supra note 42, at vi (basing estimates on a review of state drinking water 
disclosure documents).  
 111 Id. at 55. Atrazine volatilizes and enters the atmosphere, and then is redeposited by 
rain. Id. 
 112 Id. (“According to the EPA, short-term human exposure to atrazine may cause 
prostate cancer; congestion of the heart, lungs, and kidneys; low blood pressure; muscle 
spasms; weight loss; and damage to the adrenal glands.”). 
 113 Id.  
 114 See Ruhl, supra note 8, at 298–304 (surveying environmental law as applied to 
agriculture and finding exemptions in the Clean Water Act, Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act, Comprehensive Environmental Cleanup and Liability Act, and the 
Environmental Protection and Community Right to Know Act). See generally Mary Jane 
Angelo, The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, in FOOD, AGRICULTURE, 
AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 129 (Mary Jane Angelo, Jason J. Czarnezki & William S. 
Eubanks II eds., 2013) (describing shortfalls of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act in reigning in excessive pesticide use); Teresa B. Clemmer, Agriculture 
and the Clean Air Act, in FOOD, AGRICULTURE, AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra, at 163 
(describing applicability of the Clean Air Act to agriculture and observing that even where 
the statute does apply, state and federal regulators have been reluctant to enforce it). Many 
commentators attribute these carve outs to the phenomenon of “agricultural 
exceptionalism,” under which farms are given special treatment in the law to protect the 
family farmer and to ensure availability of low cost food. See Jim Chen & Edward S. 
Adams, Feudalism Unmodified: Discourses on Farms and Firms, 45 DRAKE L. REV. 361, 
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obligation to mitigate environmental externalities.115 Instead, the costs of a 
farm’s environmental harms are borne either by the general population or by 
future generations. Costs are borne indirectly by, among others, the health care 
system.116  
In the case of drinking water contamination, however, cleanup 
responsibility and costs are expressly allocated, under federal law, to public 
water utilities.117 Once the EPA has set a national standard for a particular 
pollutant, public water utilities then bear an enforceable obligation to engage 
in end-of-line clean up, eliminating the contaminant before it reaches the tap. 
The interplay of the SDWA, which imposes this obligation, and the CWA, 
which releases farmers from an enforceable federal obligation to prevent 
pollution at the source, allocates responsibility for one of the major costs of 
agricultural water pollution to water utilities, and thus to ratepayers. It 
establishes a norm for end-of-line cleanup as opposed to mitigation at the 
source. 
1. The Safe Drinking Water Act 
The SDWA, originally passed in 1974,118 requires the EPA to set safe 
drinking water standards for regulated contaminants.119 The statute first 
requires the EPA to determine which contaminants should be regulated. In 
making this determination, the EPA considers the potential adverse effects of 
the contaminant on human health, the frequency of contamination in public 
drinking water systems, and the potential for regulation to meaningfully 
reduce public health risks.120 Once the EPA decides to regulate a particular 
contaminant, it sets a Maximum Contaminant Level Goal; a “maximum 
contaminant level goal established under this subsection shall be set at the 
level at which no known or anticipated adverse effects on the health of persons 
                                                                                                                     
372–76 (1997) (cataloguing the wide range of laws designed to “protect the family farm”). 
Note, however, the inherent tension between protecting farmers and ensuring low cost 
food. 
 115 See Ruhl, supra note 8, at 267–68, 268 n.6. 
 116 E.g., id. at 284 (“[M]ore than 14 million Americans drink public water obtained 
from river sources that contain herbicides, and millions more ingest pesticides in drinking 
water obtained from groundwater sources.” (footnote omitted)). 
 117 See infra Part II.C.1.  
 118 Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974 (SDWA), Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1160 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 119 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1 (2012) (establishing requirements for national drinking water 
regulations).  
 120 Id. § 300g-1(b)(1)(A). The EPA is also required to maintain a contaminant 
candidate list of unregulated contaminants that may require standards. See id. § 300g-
1(b)(1)(B) (requiring that the EPA “publish a list of contaminants which, at the time of 
publication, are not subject to any proposed or promulgated national primary drinking 
water regulation, which are known or anticipated to occur in public water systems, and 
which may require regulation”).  
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occur and which allows an adequate margin of safety.”121 Relying on that goal 
level, it then sets a Maximum Contaminant Level, which takes into account 
technical feasibility and is set as close to the goal level as is achievable given 
the best available technology.122  
The statute then directs the EPA to delegate administration of the drinking 
water standards to states. All states except Wyoming have accepted that 
delegation and have primacy over SDWA enforcement.123 States must 
establish standards at least as stringent as EPA requirements but are free to 
establish stricter requirements.124 
Ultimately, the primary responsibility for ensuring safe drinking water lies 
with public water utilities, which are charged with upholding the federal 
standards, including the maximum contaminant levels, implementing 
treatment, filtration, and testing protocols, and complying with public 
disclosure requirements. The disclosure requirements, added to the law in 
1996, require that all water systems notify consumers within twenty-four hours 
of any violations with potential health consequences.125 In addition, 
community water systems must send all ratepayers an annual “consumer 
confidence report” identifying contaminants found in the system.126  
Although the statute considers the possibility of source water protection as 
an alternative to or in addition to treatment and filtration, there are no 
requirements to engage in source water protection.127 SDWA source water 
protection programs include two general programs governing source water—
filtration avoidance and source assessment—and a suite of programs aimed 
specifically at protecting groundwater.  
The filtration avoidance program allows water utilities with adequate 
source water control to forego standard water filtration technology 
                                                                                                                     
 121 Id. § 300g-1(b)(4)(A). 
 122 Id. § 300g-1(b)(4)(B). In some circumstances, where measurement is technically 
difficult, the EPA mandates a particular treatment technique rather than a maximum 
contaminant level. Id. § 300g-1(b)(7)(A).  
 123 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 816-F-04-030, UNDERSTANDING THE SAFE 
DRINKING WATER ACT (June 2004), http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-
04/documents/epa816f04030.pdf [https://perma.cc/T9LA-RT6J]. The District of Columbia 
also does not have primacy. Id. 
 124 40 C.F.R. § 142.10(a) (2015) (requiring that the state has adopted “drinking water 
regulations which are no less stringent than the national primary drinking water 
regulations”).  
 125 42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(c)(2)(C)(i). 
 126 Id. § 300g-3(c)(4)(A). These reports must include known contaminants, water 
sources, known pollutant sources, and details of any violations. 40 C.F.R. § 141.153. States 
must then prepare annual reports on compliance in public water systems and make 
summaries available to the EPA and the public. See id. § 141.155; see also 42 U.S.C. 
§ 300g-3(c)(3)(A). The EPA prepares annual national compliance reports. Id. § 300g-
3(c)(3)(B). 
 127 See 42 U.S.C. § 300j-12(g)(2)(B). 
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requirements.128 Any water utility that draws from surface water must 
implement filtration technology unless these standards are met.129 To 
participate, water systems must demonstrate comprehensive control over 
source watersheds either through direct ownership of the land or equivalent 
control.130 Water systems must also demonstrate, through testing, that drinking 
water meets federal standards without filtration.131  
The SDWA Amendments of 1996 added the important mandate that states 
engage in source assessment, mapping source water protection areas, 
inventorying potential sources of contamination, determining susceptibility to 
contamination, and publishing survey results.132 Although the resulting data is 
a valuable tool for implementing source water protection, SDWA itself does 
not require that states put any protection into place. In a short brochure on this 
program, the EPA explains that, “While source water protection was not 
specifically mandated by SDWA, US EPA and its partners encourage states, 
tribes, and communities to use the information from source water assessments 
to protect the delineated source water protection areas from identified 
pollution sources of major concern.”133  
The SDWA groundwater protection programs include sole source aquifer 
protection, underground injection control, and wellhead protection. The sole 
source aquifer protection program protects source waters in areas where there 
are few or no alternative sources and use of an alternative source would be 
extremely costly.134 Once an aquifer receives this designation, the EPA 
undertakes mandatory review of any proposed project receiving federal 
funding that might endanger the water source.135 As the EPA itself 
acknowledges, the designation of a sole source aquifer by no means constitutes 
“a comprehensive ground water protection program. Protection of ground 
water resources can best be achieved through an integrated and coordinated 
combination of federal, state, and local efforts.”136 EPA goes on to encourage 
                                                                                                                     
 128 See, e.g., N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, NEW YORK CITY FILTRATION AVOIDANCE 
DETERMINATION 1 (May 2014), https://www.health.ny.gov/environmental/water/drinking/n 
ycfad/docs/final_revised_2007_fad_may_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ZMC-9YW3]. 
 129 40 C.F.R. § 141.70(b). 
 130 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(7)(C) (directing EPA to establish criteria for when filtration 
will be required). 
 131 See N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, supra note 128, at 1. 
 132 See generally Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996 (SDWAA), Pub. L. 
No. 104-182, 110 Stat. 1613 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42. U.S.C.). 
 133 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 816-F-04-032, PROTECTING DRINKING WATER 
SOURCES (June 2004), https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/3000667S.PDF?Dockey=3000 
667S.PDF [https://perma.cc/DC44-8ZSY]. 
 134 42 U.S.C. § 300h-3(a)(1). 
 135 Id. § 300h-3(e). 
 136 Sole Source Aquifer Project Review, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
https://www.epa.gov/dwssa/sole-source-aquifer-project-review#limits [https://perma.cc/9S 
4Y-WHPW] (last updated Oct. 27, 2016). The EPA also notes that many critical aquifers 
are not protected simply because no one has petitioned for sole source aquifer status. Id. 
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interjurisdictional cooperation, land use restrictions, public education, and land 
purchase as protection strategies.137 Nationwide, only eighty aquifers have 
received this designation.138 
The Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program protects underground 
sources of drinking water against contamination from injection wells.139 
Injection wells—used for waste disposal, long term CO2 storage, and natural 
gas and petroleum production—place fluid deep underground into porous rock 
formations, such as sandstone or limestone, or into or below the shallow soil 
layer.140 The federal UIC program authorizes the EPA to regulate injection 
well activity.141 Federal regulations are designed “to ensure that either: 
[i]njected fluids stay within the well and the intended injection zone,” or 
mandate that “[f]luids that are directly or indirectly injected into [an 
underground source of drinking water] do not cause a public water system to 
violate drinking water standards.”142 The EPA sets standards addressing 
construction, operation, and monitoring on the basis of well classes.143 
Classifications are based on well proximity to an underground source of 
drinking water and the type of injection.144  
Finally, the 1988 SDWA amendments contained a requirement for 
wellhead protection, mandating that states identify wellhead protection areas 
                                                                                                                     
 137 Id. (implicitly cross referencing to the Underground Injection Control Program, the 
Clean Water Act, and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act as source water 
protection tools). 
 138 Region 5 Water: Sole Source Aquifer FAQs, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
https://www3.epa.gov/region5/water/gwdw/solesourceaquifer/ssa-faqs.html [https://perma. 
cc/SJW6-ZQBD] (last updated Feb. 22, 2016) (listing the number of sole source acquirers 
nationwide as of June 2013). 
 139 “An underground source of drinking water . . . is an aquifer or part of an aquifer 
that is currently used as a drinking water source,” or may be “needed as a drinking water 
source in the future.” General Information About Injection Wells, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION 
AGENCY (2016), http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/basicinformation.cfm [https://p 
erma.cc/Y9F8-GX9H]. Specifically, an underground source of drinking water “supplies 
any public water system . . . for human consumption” or “contains fewer than 10,000 mg/l 
total dissolved solids.” 40 C.F.R. § 144.3 (2015). 
 140 General Information About Injection Wells, supra note 139. Importantly, Congress 
has expressly excluded injection of fluids for the purpose of oil and gas production from 
the statutory definition of underground injection, thereby excluding hydraulic fracturing 
from regulation. See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, sec. 322, § 1421(d), 
119 Stat. 594, 694 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)). 
 141 42 U.S.C. § 300h. The Act requires the EPA to develop minimum federal 
regulations for UIC programs; the EPA may then approve state programs that meet those 
requirements. Id. Currently, the EPA has delegated primacy for thirty-three states and three 
territories, and shares responsibility in seven states; it implements a program in ten states, 
two territories, the District of Columbia, and most Indian Tribes. General Information 
About Injection Wells, supra note 139. 
 142 General Information About Injection Wells, supra note 139. 
 143 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 146.12–.14. 
 144 2 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., RODGERS’ ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER 
§ 4:8, Westlaw (database updated Dec. 2015). 
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and develop a program that contains appropriate protections.145 This program 
gives states substantial leeway, and while “some states require community 
water systems to develop management plans” or mandate local level 
protections, “others rely on education and technical assistance to encourage 
voluntary action.”146 
Although these SDWA programs encourage and provide some support for 
source water protection, they require very little. Many municipalities engage in 
some degree of source water protection, but a recent Natural Resources 
Defense Council assessment of the state of drinking water systems found that 
many cities had inadequate source protection, and that many had “serious and 
immediate needs for better source water protection.”147  
2. Clean Water Act 
The CWA is SDWA’s more broadly applicable and more widely discussed 
older sibling. Passed in its modern form in 1972,148 the statute establishes a 
(quasi) comprehensive program for water pollution prevention. As has been 
well-documented elsewhere, however, it turns a blind eye to nonpoint source 
pollution, particularly that from farms.149 The statute allocates regulatory 
authority over nonpoint sources, including agricultural runoff, to the states, 
which are free to implement robust controls but typically choose not to. 
The statute’s primary regulatory tool is the National Pollution Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES) permitting program, which prohibits any 
discharge of pollutants from a point source into the waters of the United States 
without a permit.150 As amended in 1977,151 the statute expressly excludes 
both irrigation return flows and agricultural stormwater runoff from its 
                                                                                                                     
 145 42 U.S.C. § 300h-7. 
 146 REGION 8, U.S ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 908K10003, EVERYTHING YOU 
WANTED TO KNOW ABOUT ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND RELATED 
PROGRAMS . . . . BUT WERE AFRAID TO ASK! 40 (Dec. 2010), https://www.epa.gov/sites/pro 
duction/files/documents/EnvRegSC_Hndbk.pdf [https://perma.cc/4S6W-BGAZ]. 
 147 OLSON, supra note 42, at xii. The report also argues that a healthy water system 
must have good treatment, good maintenance and operation protocols, and good source 
water protection. Id. at 16. 
 148 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 
Stat. 816 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.) The statute was later 
renamed, and is now commonly referred to as, the “Clean Water Act” or “CWA.” See infra 
note 151. 
 149 See supra notes 7–9 (citing sources); see also Craig, supra note 6, at 181 (stating 
that the determination to allocate authority over point sources to the federal government 
and authority over nonpoint sources to states is “arguably [a] misjudgment because there is 
growing recognition in this country that nonpoint source pollution is the last national water 
pollution problem to solve”). 
 150 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2012) (prohibiting discharge except as in compliance with the 
Act); id. § 1312 (establishing the NPDES program). 
 151 Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.). 
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definition of “point source.”152 Thus, with the exception of concentrated 
animal feeding operations (CAFOs), more commonly known as feedlots, 
which are expressly included in the definition of point source, farms are not 
subject to the NPDES permitting requirements.153 For CAFOs, the NPDES 
can be a powerful tool for source drinking water protection, but for all other 
farms, it is not.154  
In addition, the CWA also has extremely limited application to 
groundwater. Even where NPDES permitting is required, it extends to release 
of pollutants into groundwater only in very limited circumstances where 
groundwater is closely linked hydrologically to surface water.155 Thus, even if 
NPDES applied to farms, many underground drinking water sources would 
remain unprotected.156 
While traditional command and control regulatory tools provide little 
oversight of nonpoint source pollution, other types of regulatory tools address 
them more directly. For instance, several other secondary CWA programs 
address nonpoint source pollution through land use planning and best practice 
guides. These include CWA sections 208,157 319,158 and 303.159 Sections 208 
and 319 both direct states to develop nonpoint source management plans.160 
The EPA assists in this process by providing detailed nonpoint source 
pollution “best management practices” guides on which states can model 
localized management plans.161 Although these programs provide some 
funding and a framework for state efforts at nonpoint source pollution, neither 
program imposes mandatory enforceable pollution control obligations on 
states.162 
                                                                                                                     
 152 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). 
 153 Id. 
 154 See Jan G. Laitos & Heidi Ruckriegle, The Clean Water Act and the Challenge of 
Agricultural Pollution, 37 VT. L. REV. 1033, 1058–61 (2013) (proving a history of CAFO 
regulation). See generally William M. McLaren, The Death of the Duty to Apply: 
Limitations to CAFO Oversight Following Waterkeeper & National Pork Producers, 11 J. 
ANIMAL & NAT. RESOURCE L. 87 (2015) (explaining how recent litigation has limited the 
applicability of the CWA to CAFOs). 
 155 2 RODGERS, supra note 144, § 4:8. 
 156 The Clean Water Act’s other major permitting program, section 404, does not 
provide a blanket exemption for agriculture. 33 U.S.C. § 1314. This program requires 
permits for the discharge of dredge and fill materials into waters of the United States. Id. 
 157 Id. § 1288. 
 158 Id. § 1329. 
 159 Id. § 1313. 
 160 Id. §§ 1288, 1329. 
 161 Id. § 1329. Section 319 of the CWA provides federal funding to support BMP 
implementation. Id. Approximately half of the funds earmarked for section 319 programs 
are devoted to implementing broad NPS pollution remedies; the remaining funds are used 
to help develop local water quality solutions. OFFICE OF WETLANDS, OCEANS & 
WATERSHEDS, supra note 34, at 1. 
 162 Zaring, supra note 9, at 522–28 (describing the two sections in operation).  
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Section 303 establishes a slightly more robust nonpoint source regulatory 
program requiring states to identify impaired bodies of water (bodies of water 
that do not meet water quality standards).163 States must then determine the 
total maximum daily load (TMDL) of any contaminant for which the water 
body is impaired and allocate that total load among the various pollution 
sources.164 One function of this program is to tie the NPDES permitting 
process, which is otherwise based only on best available technology, to water 
quality standards for local waterways.165 State regulators are free to allocate 
the TMDL in any manner and can thus choose to bypass any agricultural 
nonpoint sources in the waterway and mandate pollution reduction only from 
point sources.166 For waterways with no point source contributors, however, 
this program theoretically forces state regulators to mandate pollution 
reduction from nonpoint sources.167 In practice, because the statute provides 
for no enforcement mechanism, states are free to ignore the TMDL once it is 
established.168 A handful of states exercise more robust nonpoint source 
pollution regulatory programs.169  
                                                                                                                     
 163 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(A). CWA directs states to establish water quality standards 
for bodies of water based on designated uses. Id. § 1313(a)–(c). 
 164 Id. § 1313(d)(1)(C).  
 165 See Oliver A. Houck, The Clean Water Act Returns (Again): Part I, TMDLs and the 
Chesapeake Bay, 41 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10208, 10209 & n.16 (2011). 
 166 See id. at 10209 & n.14. TMDLs also create a connection between point source and 
nonpoint source polluters, imposing costs of nonpoint source pollution on point sources. Id. 
at 10209. If a state resists regulating nonpoint sources, point sources on an impaired 
waterway may need to make additional reductions beyond what was already required in 
their technology-based permit standards. See id. at 10210–11. 
 167 See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(c) (requiring states to identify all waterways with 
insufficient controls). Indeed, in order to meet TMDL goals, many states impose 
mandatory requirements on farms. In a comprehensive assessment of state-level 
agricultural water pollution programs, Robin Kundis Craig and Terry Schley Noto 
identified seven states with such programs, including Arizona, Florida, Idaho, Nevada, 
North Carolina, Oregon, and Washington. ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG & TERRY SCHLEY NOTO, 
ENVTL. DEF. FUND, STATE NONPOINT SOURCE CONTROL PROGRAMS FOR AGRICULTURE: A 
LOOK AT AGRICULTURAL CERTAINTY 7 (2012) (on file with author).  
 168 Ruhl, supra note 8, at 302 (explaining that the TMDL program provides no 
independent authority for enforcing load reduction allocations against nonpoint sources); 
see infra notes 274–78 and accompanying text (providing more context on development of 
TMDLs as a robust regulatory tool and strategies EPA has used to sidestep its limited 
enforcement options). 
 169 Robin Kundis Craig & Anna M. Roberts, When Will Governments Regulate 
Nonpoint Source Pollution? A Comparative Perspective, 42 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 2 
(2015) (characterizing the existing regulatory structure as creating “a de facto fifty-state 
experiment in regulation—or, often, non-regulation—of [nonpoint source] water 
pollution,” and observing that “[s]tate and regional variations in addressing nonpoint 
source pollution can be extreme, but one pattern is discernible: States and regions always 
need a significant water quality interest with political salience before they will adopt actual 
nonpoint source regulation in the form of enforceable requirements”); see infra 
Part IV.B.3.b.i (describing state-level innovation). 
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In sum, although both the SDWA and the CWA provide technical support 
and funding for source water protection, neither statute requires such 
protection. Instead, both statutes allow states to determine whether or not to 
engage in source water protection, and the SDWA requires water utilities to 
engage in end-of-line cleanup regardless of whether that protection is in place. 
D. Clean Up Options and Costs  
This pollution generates both individual and public costs. Individual costs 
fall into three general categories: water rate increases (or other water utility fee 
increases such as increased hook up costs), avoidance costs, and health care 
costs. It is difficult to isolate rate increases related to nonpoint source pollution 
in particular, but EPA has estimated that total compliance costs have led to 
rate increases ranging from 2% per household ($3 per year) to 55% per 
household ($145 per year).170 
Avoidance costs include various household level costs incurred to avoid 
drinking contaminated tap water, and typical avoidance activities include 
purchase of bottled water and installation of home filtration systems.171 One 
national study estimated that Americans spend about $942 million per year to 
purchase bottled water in response to contamination that affects tap water taste 
and odor.172 A recent study of the San Joaquin Valley in California found that 
70% of surveyed households had avoidance costs exceeding 1.5% of 
household income.173 The EPA’s established water affordability threshold is 
1.5%.174 Nitrates are a primary contaminant of concern in that region.175  
The EPA estimates that nonpoint source pollution (including 
nonagricultural sources) imposes about $21 billion in annual costs for drinking 
water systems.176 Individual examples show how particular water utilities have 
responded to nonpoint source pollution threats with infrastructure 
improvements. The following are a series of illustrative examples: 
 After a 1993 cryptosporidium outbreak, the City of Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin spent about $89 million on infrastructure improvements.177  
 In neighboring Minnesota, the Minnesota Department of Agriculture 
recently reviewed efforts in five municipalities to manage nitrate 
                                                                                                                     
 170 Steinzor, supra note 13, at 208–09. 
 171 MOORE & MATALON, supra note 90, at 16. 
 172 STATE-EPA NUTRIENT INNOVATIONS TASK GRP., supra note 98, at 5 (measured in 
2008 dollars). 
 173 MOORE & MATALON, supra note 90, at 28. 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. at 9–10; OLSON, supra note 66, at 52–54, 53 fig.1. 
 176 RIBAUDO ET AL., supra note 22, at 16 tbl.1-3 (citing a 1997 EPA study breaking 
down the cost to $20 billion for microbial treatment, “$0.2 billion for nitrates, and $0.5 
billion for other synthetic chemicals, including pesticides”). 
 177 See supra note 33.  
1222 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 77:6 
contamination.178 Each city had installed nitrate filtration equipment at 
construction costs ranging from $350 per resident to $970 per 
resident.179  
 In the San Joaquin Valley, a survey of response projects found $62 
million of proposed projects to address nitrate contamination alone 
and an additional $88 million for projects that proposed to address 
nitrate contamination and other concerns.180  
 In its complaint against neighboring irrigation districts, the City of 
Des Moines’ Water Works estimates that it has spent almost $9 
million already and would need to spend at least $76 million more to 
continue meeting federal nitrate standards.181  
 According to an EPA report, Fremont, Ohio will need to spend 
approximately $15 million to manage nitrate contaminate.182 It is a 
city of only 20,000.183  
 In 2009, the Oklahoma Water Resources Board estimated that it could 
save between $106 and $615 million if it implemented effective 
regulation of chlorophyll, which is essential to the growth of 
cyanobacteria.184 
 Between 2002 and 2012, Waco, Texas incurred approximately $70.4 
million in costs to address tap water taste and odor problems 
stemming from algal blooms.185 
The EPA estimates that for small water systems serving fewer than 500 
people, responding to nitrate contamination could require capital investment of 
about $280,000 and annual operating costs of $17,500.186 For larger systems 
                                                                                                                     
 178 MINN. DEP’T OF AGRIC., DRINKING WATER PROTECTION SERIES: NITRATE 
CONTAMINATION—WHAT IS THE COST?, http://www.mda.state.mn.us/protecting/waterprote 
ction/~/media/Files/protecting/waterprotection/dwps2.ashx [https://perma.cc/7J76-NSRV]. 
 179 Id. 
 180 MOORE & MATALON, supra note 90, at 44. 
 181 See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text; see also STATE-EPA NUTRIENT 
INNOVATIONS TASK GRP., supra note 98, at 5 (noting that the Des Moines Water Works 
constructed a $4 million (in 1991 dollars) facility, which is used about forty-three days per 
year and costs $3000 per day to operate).  
 182 STATE-EPA NUTRIENT INNOVATIONS TASK GRP., supra note 98, at 5. 
 183 Id. 
 184 Id. 
 185 Catherine R. Dunlap et al., A Costly Endeavor: Addressing Algae Problems in a 
Water Supply, 107 J. AM. WATER WORKS ASS’N E255, E255 (2015) (estimating lost 
revenue for the same period between $6.9 and $10.3 million); Waco Water Quality & 
Quantity Improvements Project, WATER & WASTES DIG. (Dec. 14, 2011), 
http://www.wwdmag.com/waco-water-quality-quantity-improvements-project [https://per 
ma.cc/MX8W-28RK] (tying algal blooms to concentration of dairy farms surrounding the 
city). 
 186 STATE-EPA NUTRIENT INNOVATIONS TASK GRP., supra note 98, at 4. 
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serving up to 3,300 people, the capital cost could exceed a half million, and 
the operating costs could exceed $50,000.187 
Many states and water utilities do engage in some degree of source water 
protection.188 Seattle has one of the most robust programs, relying heavily on 
the outright purchase of land in the watershed as well as purchase of 
conservation easements to limit development.189 Other source water protection 
strategies include use of green payments and zoning. Despite these options, 
most municipalities do not have robust source water protection programs and 
instead rely on the infrastructure options described above.190  
III. CHALLENGING THE ANTI-MITIGATION NORM 
As Part I explains, the interplay of the SDWA and the CWA establishes a 
default rule of no mitigation at the source and allocates at least some of the 
costs of nonpoint source pollution cleanup to public water utilities. By way of 
simple explanation, these two outcomes follow from two long-standing 
political norms. First, farmers should be insulated from the costs of mitigating 
environmental harm.191 Second, provision of clean drinking water is an 
essential function of government, and, more specifically, of local 
government.192 As many scholars have argued, the first principle is deeply 
problematic on its own.193 This Part looks at the consequences of the first 
principle in light of the second, arguing that the interaction of the CWA and 
SDWA statutory schemes not only provides additional fodder for the critique 
of the CWA’s failure to regulate agricultural sources but also reveals that the 
SDWA’s own primary focus on purification is flawed. 
                                                                                                                     
 187 Id. 
 188 OLSON, supra note 42, at 38 (identifying Seattle, Boston, San Francisco, and 
Denver as having “at least some well-protected watersheds”). 
 189 Id. at 38–39, 41 
 190 Id. at 39 (“While most cities reviewed need stronger source water protection, some 
cities, including Albuquerque, Atlanta, Detroit, Fresno, Houston, Los Angeles, 
Manchester, Newark, Philadelphia, Phoenix, and San Diego, have serious and immediate 
needs for better source water protection.”). 
 191 This is as much a statement about the political power of agricultural interests as it is 
about a firmly held political belief. See, e.g., Chen & Adams, supra note 114, at 372–75 
(discussing laws protecting farms); Craig & Roberts, supra note 169, at 2 (“[I]n politically 
powerful agricultural states, there needs to be a countervailing and prominent water quality 
concern to motivate states to regulate nonpoint source pollution in general and agricultural 
nonpoint source pollution in particular.”); Susan A. Schneider, A Reconsideration of 
Agricultural Law: A Call for the Law of Food, Farming, and Sustainability, 34 WM. & 
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 935, 935–36 (2010) (describing the many forms of 
“[a]gricultural exceptionalism”). 
 192 See generally SALZMAN, supra note 26. 
 193 See supra notes 8, 9, 114 (citing sources skeptical of agricultural carve outs). 
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A. The Costs of the Status Quo 
Direct drinking-water related costs of water contamination fall into two 
general categories: public costs, which include the costs of installing treatment 
facilities, drilling new wells, subsidizing the purchase of water from alternate 
sources, and education about water contamination; and private costs, which 
include home filtration systems, purchase of alternative water sources, higher 
use fees (water rates), and higher taxes.194  
1. Efficiency 
The statutory scheme assigns these costs to water users and ratepayers 
regardless of whether this back end response is more expensive than pollution 
prevention. Although there is no comprehensive cost benefit analysis 
comparing the costs of source water protection with end-of-line cleanup, a few 
specific examples demonstrate that the former will be less expensive, at least 
some of the time. For instance, faced with the prospect of needing to spend $6 
to $8 billion on new filtration infrastructure, New York City chose instead to 
increase controls over source water at a cost of less than $300 million over ten 
years.195 In addition, the city built a filtration system for one part of its system 
at a cost of $3.1 billion, for an overall savings of around $2.5 billion.196  
A related concern is that end-of-line cleanup may not always be effective, 
particularly for contaminants that are difficult to test for. Where testing for a 
contaminant is not technologically or economically feasible, the EPA can 
specify a treatment technique rather than a performance standard.197 The 
Agency currently maintains treatment technique requirements in lieu of 
maximum contaminant levels for ten contaminants including cryptosporidium, 
total coliforms, and turbidity.198 These treatment standards may lead to under 
protection where the contaminant is present in high enough levels that the 
standard treatment technique is inadequate. Under these circumstances, 
prevention at the source is critical to ensuring safe drinking water.199 
Further, the presence of microbial contaminants such as cryptosporidium 
generates the need for water treatment, but standard treatment processes can 
                                                                                                                     
 194 MOORE & MATALON, supra note 90, at 15 (cataloguing drinking water costs). 
 195 HILLARY BROWN, NEXT GENERATION INFRASTRUCTURE: PRINCIPLES FOR POST-
INDUSTRIAL PUBLIC WORKS 91–94 (2014). 
 196 Id. 
 197 SDWA, 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(7)(A) (2012). 
 198 Reviewing Treatment Methods for Six-Year Review of Drinking Water Standards, 
U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/dwsixyearreview/reviewing-
treatment-methods-six-year-review-drinking-water-standards [https://perma.cc/G9AH-
FKMH] (last updated July 22, 2016); see also 40 C.F.R. § 141.712 (2015) (establishing 
unfiltered system cryptosporidium treatment requirements). 
 199 Conversely, treatment standards may lead to overprotection where a contaminant is 
present in very low levels and implementation of the technique is unnecessary. In this 
circumstance, the SDWA offers a variance procedure. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-4(a)(3).  
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themselves introduce contaminants into drinking water. Pursuant to SDWA, 
the EPA requires all water systems that draw on surface water to filter and 
disinfect that water.200 Water utilities typically use chlorine to disinfect, but 
chlorine can interact with organic compounds generating harmful disinfectant 
byproducts such as trihalomethane and haloacetic acid.201 Although reducing 
agricultural contamination would not eliminate the need for surface water 
treatment, it could reduce the need significantly. 
Why would a water utility not engage in source water protection if that is 
the cheaper and more effective option? There are several critical barriers. One 
is that source water protection is not necessarily an immediate fix. A water 
system suffering from current federal standard exceedence is unlikely to 
expend limited resources on a solution that could take many years to resolve 
the problem.202 Instead, water utilities often pursue various more immediate 
options such as blending contaminated water with water from another source, 
drilling new wells, consolidating with another water system, or installing new 
or upgraded treatment equipment.203 
Another critical barrier is transaction costs complicating negotiation 
between farmers and water utilities. Comprehensive source water protection 
may require significant change to land uses within the watershed. Even if 
purchasing all land within a watershed and shutting down existing land uses 
were less expensive than building a new treatment facility, many owners may 
not want to sell. Without exercising eminent domain, which would require 
political capital likely to be absent in agricultural regions, a water utility may 
be unable to purchase enough land to achieve source water protection goals.204  
Where changes to farming practices, rather than suspending farming 
altogether, would suffice to protect drinking water quality, water utilities are 
likewise limited. Even assuming that wholesale farming practices changes 
would be less expensive than building water treatment facilities, utilities face 
                                                                                                                     
 200 See supra notes 128–30 and accompanying text (describing the surface water 
treatment rule). 
 201 Rhett Larson, Law in the Time of Cholera, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 
2017) (manuscript at 1, 34–35), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2740610 [https://perma.cc/LWH 
8-M47W] (identifying this as a tension between water law’s green agenda—to prevent 
toxic exposure—and its red agenda—to prevent the spread of disease). 
 202 MOORE & MATALON, supra note 90, at 39–43 (reviewing sixty-three exceedence 
response proposals from the San Joaquin Valley and finding that none proposed wellhead 
protection). 
 203 Id. at 39, 40 tbl.9. 
 204 Also limiting the land purchase option, not all municipalities have the power to 
exercise eminent domain beyond their territorial limits. See generally Marjorie A. Shields, 
Validity of Extraterritorial Condemnation by Municipality, 44 A.L.R. 6TH 259, 288–91 
(2009) (collecting cases). Such authority varies both from state to state and by type of local 
government. See id. In addition, where water utilities are privately operated or exist as 
quasi-governmental agencies, they may not have eminent domain authority at all. See id. 
Where the water utility cannot exercise eminent domain, a state government would need to 
get involved, further complicating the politics of such a decision. 
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two equally challenging options. First, the utility can pay farmers to adopt 
better practices. This option can be highly effective, and expansion of this type 
of tool is discussed further in Part III.B, but it also has some significant costs 
of its own that may render it unfeasible. It requires the water utility to identify 
accurately sources of contamination, to develop relationships with individual 
farmers, to identify correctly appropriate farming practices changes, and to 
enforce those changes. Each of these steps requires funding and expertise that 
many water utilities are unlikely to have. Second, utilities can lobby the state 
to adopt more stringent regulation of harmful agricultural practices.205 
Lobbying is a long-term solution with a low probability of success in many 
states.206  
Because of these transaction costs, many utilities will continue with 
traditional end-of-line treatment rather than pursuing source protection 
alternatives. Even where transaction costs are low, utilities may opt for 
traditional treatment options because of path dependency. As the technology 
of treatment and filtration developed, water utility professionals “consolidate 
their position and define themselves as the experts in that field. Other 
professionals are then likely to respect the boundaries of expertise set up by 
the particular technology, further entrenching it in practice.”207 Financial and 
physical investment may also compound path dependency. Having already 
invested significant amounts of money in treatment and filtration 
infrastructure, water utilities can become locked into that mode.208 In other 
words, it may either not occur to water utility professionals to pursue 
                                                                                                                     
 205 OLSON, supra note 42, at 42 (calling on water utilities to work with state and 
federal legislators to develop legislation appropriating funds for land acquisition and 
conservation easements and regulating source water contamination). 
 206 Although note that high salience contamination events may increase public support 
for more stringent regulation and help proregulation lobbies overcome the strength of 
agricultural resistance. See Craig & Roberts, supra note 169, at 34–35. 
 207 ERAN BEN-JOSEPH, THE CODE OF THE CITY: STANDARDS AND THE HIDDEN 
LANGUAGE OF PLACE MAKING 94 (2005) (explaining why adoption of particular 
infrastructure technology breeds path dependency). One consequence of the development 
of expertise is that others are restricted to the role of outsider, or viewed as uninformed 
members of the public “in no position to question the range of treatment methods 
available.” Id. (quoting Sharon Beder, Technological Paradigms: The Case of Sewerage 
Engineering, 4 TECH. STUD. 167, 175 (1997)). Although Beder’s case study focuses on 
sewer infrastructure and wastewater treatment, Beder, supra, at 167–69, there is no reason 
to think the same pattern would not emerge in the context of drink water utilities. 
 208 BEN-JOSEPH, supra note 207, at 91–94 (describing the various modes of path 
dependency in the context of infrastructure development). This is an example of the “sunk 
cost fallacy.” Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: 
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 
1126 (2000). Despite the standard microeconomic principle that a rational actor should not 
consider past, irretrievable expenditures in making future plans, many people nevertheless 
“routinely cite sunk costs as a reason for pursuing a particular course of action.” Korobkin 
& Ulen, supra, at 1124; see also Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A 
Behaviorial Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1490–93 (1998). 
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prevention at source options, or they may perceive transaction costs to be 
higher than they actually are.  
Further exacerbating the potential for economic inefficiency is the 
presence of numerous ancillary benefits of pollution prevention. SDWA 
cleanup addresses drinking water almost exclusively. This narrow focus on 
water’s consumptive value misses the various other consequences of nonpoint 
source pollution. Ancillary benefits of source water protection (or pollution 
prevention) include water use values such as recreation and fishing, ecosystem 
values, and aesthetic values and nonuse values such as the option value of 
clean water, the stewardship value, and the vicarious consumption value.209  
Although a comprehensive survey of the benefits of clean water is beyond 
the scope of this project, it is worth mentioning one example of the potential 
value of source pollution prevention.210 As the USDA’s Economic Research 
Service has noted, “Comprehensive estimates of the damages from agricultural 
pollution are lacking, but soil erosion alone is estimated to cost water users $2 
billion to $8 billion annually.”211 Sediment is a useful example because these 
costs are felt in a wide range of water contexts.212 For drinking water utilities, 
sediment can lead to reservoir siltation, decreasing the reservoirs useful life, 
and can increase water treatment costs.213 At the same time, sediment from 
soil erosion can degrade aquatic habitats, reducing biodiversity and harming 
commercial and recreational fisheries.214 Sediment can also clog roadside 
ditches and raise streambeds, increasing the probability and severity of floods 
and impinging on maritime navigation.215 
Neither farmers, in selecting farming practices, nor water utilities, in 
identifying SDWA compliance options, have reason to take these ancillary 
benefits into account. Farmers face few regulatory consequences for water 
pollution. Water utility decision makers have no reason to consider these 
ancillary costs because their success is measured only on SDWA compliance 
and public health protection. As a result, even where ancillary benefits would 
justify a switch from end-of-line purification to pollution prevention, they will 
likely not be taken into account.  
From a standard utilitarian perspective, end-of-line cleanup is not the most 
efficient policy choice. It misses the opportunity to achieve multiple benefits 
                                                                                                                     
 209 MOORE & MATALON, supra note 90, at 16 & tbl.1 (citing a 1995 USDA Economic 
Research Service study cataloguing various benefits of clean water). 
 210 For a more detailed description of the various benefits of clean water, see RIBAUDO 
ET AL., supra note 22, at 16 tbl.1-3. See supra Part II.B for a description of the various 
consequences of nutrient and pesticide pollution. 
 211 RIBAUDO ET AL., supra note 22, at iv. Agriculture causes soil erosion by reducing 
plant coverage and making top soil susceptible to both wind and water erosion. See id. at 
6–7. 
 212 Soil eroding into water waters settles to the bottom of those waterways, becoming 
sediment. See id. 
 213 Id. at 7.  
 214 Id. 
 215 Id. 
1228 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 77:6 
with the same resource expenditure. Other water pollution harms either go 
unabated or are paid for separately. For instance, taking the soil erosion 
example from above, the same soil erosion may generate costs for a water 
utility that has to modify its filtration system to address suspended solids, and 
a public works department that has to repeatedly dredge a shipping channel. 
Put another way, by declining to prevent pollution at the source, a community 
may ultimately have to pay for that pollution several times over. Again, in 
simple utilitarian terms, by creating a presumption in favor of end-of-line 
cleanup rather than pollution prevention, the SDWA/CWA regulatory scheme 
does not maximize net benefits. 
2. Equity 
Not only is the SDWA/CWA scheme not welfare maximizing, it is also 
not equitable. Allocating agricultural nonpoint source pollution costs to water 
users can have disparate impacts on low-income populations and minority 
populations in both urban and rural areas and can lead to arbitrary distribution 
of clean water costs.  
Data regarding disparate impacts of agricultural drinking water pollution is 
limited in part because community water systems are not required to gather 
socioeconomic data on their users,216 but several studies suggest that there are 
serious reasons for concern. For instance, a recent study of nitrate 
contamination in the San Joaquin Valley of California revealed that 
contamination costs were borne disproportionately by smaller water systems 
and by low-income and Latino ratepayers.217 These ratepayers paid extensive 
avoidance costs, including the costs of purchasing, installing, and maintaining 
household filters and purchase of bottled water.218 In that region, about 70% of 
those surveyed spent more than 1.5% of income on avoidance costs (EPA’s 
affordability threshold for water),219 and on average were spending 4.4% of 
                                                                                                                     
 216 James VanDerslice, Drinking Water Infrastructure and Environmental Disparities: 
Evidence and Methodological Considerations, 101 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S109, S111 
(2011). 
 217 MOORE & MATALON, supra note 90, at 14 (finding that studies controlling for water 
utility size show that utilities serving a higher proportion of Latinos were more likely to 
have higher levels of nitrates); see also VanDerslice, supra note 216, at S111 (describing 
another study finding a correlation between water quality and ethnicity and poverty). 
 218 MOORE & MATALON, supra note 90, at 18. 
 219 Id. at 28. About 14% of drinking water utilities offer some type of subsidies to low-
income customers. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 52, at 26. The United 
Nations has identified 3% as the appropriate threshold. International Decade for Action 
‘Water for Life’ 2005-2015, UNITED NATIONS DEP’T ECON. & SOC. AFF., 
http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/human_right_to_water.shtml [https://perma.cc/MRY 
5-BKQX] (last updated May 29, 2014). Estimates for affordability range from around 0.8% 
of median household income to as high as 2.5% of median household income. See Aaron 
Janzen et al., Cost Recovery and Affordability in Small Drinking Water Treatment Plants in 
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income on water for avoidance costs and water rates combined.220 Other 
studies look generally at drinking water contamination, finding 
disproportionate burdens on low-income communities and communities of 
color.221 
A related concern is the burden of SDWA compliance on residents served 
by smaller water utilities. For these utilities, serving anywhere from twenty-
five to several thousand people, infrastructure improvement and maintenance 
can impose significant per ratepayer costs. Estimates at the scope of these 
costs range dramatically. A 1990s EPA study found average costs in smaller 
systems for SDWA compliance to be $145 per year per household.222 A more 
recent Minnesota study found costs as high as $970 per resident.223 
Nevertheless, these figures point to the difficulty in smaller systems to spread 
costs among ratepayers, and the burden on residents in these communities, 
which are often low-income rural areas.  
In smaller systems or in systems serving low-income populations, rising 
compliance costs raise concerns about the system’s effectiveness at achieving 
a nationwide right to water. Although the right to water is nowhere codified in 
U.S. law, this Article takes it as a foundational principle that should motivate 
any call for law reform.224 The right to water requires that all people have 
                                                                                                                     
Alberta, Canada, 108 J. AM. WATER WORKS ASS’N E290, E293 (2016) (describing various 
affordability measures). 
 220 MOORE & MATALON, supra note 90, at 28. 
 221 VanDerslice, supra note 216, at S111 (finding some evidence of disparities both 
with regard to water quality and with regard to adequate household plumbing, but finding 
the data sparse and calling for additional research). 
 222 Steinzor, supra note 13, at 208–09. Under some circumstances, smaller systems, 
serving fewer than 3300 people, can obtain affordability-based variances, but only if the 
variance still ensures adequate protection of public health. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300g-4(e) to -5 
(2012); TIEMANN, supra note 46, at 6 (describing operation of SDWA variance and 
exemption programs). 
 223 See supra notes 178–79 and accompanying text (giving more detail on Minnesota 
report and citing sources). The Minnesota study looked not at actual payments per person 
but rather at the per capita cost of the system improvements. MINN. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra 
note 178; see also Janzen et al., supra note 219, at E295 (finding that to achieve full cost 
recovery, many water systems would need to charge users more than 2% of median 
household income, which the authors deemed to be an appropriate affordability threshold).  
 224 The existence of SDWA itself, in combination with building codes requiring indoor 
plumbing, creates a sort of statutory right to water. Although the statute itself has no 
statement of purpose, the legislative history contains several useful assertions focusing 
primarily on water quality. The House Report accompanying the first act provided: “The 
purpose of the legislation is to assure that water supply systems serving the public meet 
minimum national standards for protection of public health.” H.R. REP. NO. 93-1185, at 1 
(1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6454, 6454. Later statements also hinted at the 
importance of affordability, though from the perspective of the state rather than individual 
ratepayers. In the 1977 amendments, a House Report noted that the purpose of the new bill 
is, among other things, to “authorize appropriations for certain fiscal years for purposes of 
providing assistance to States with respect to safe drinking water.” H.R. REP. NO. 95-338, 
at 1 (1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3648, 3649; see also S. REP. NO. 104-169, 
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adequate water.225 Adequacy, in turn, has three attributes: (1) availability: 
“[t]he water supply for each person must be sufficient and continuous for 
personal and domestic uses”; (2) quality: “[t]he water required for each 
personal or domestic use must be safe”; and (3) accessibility: “water facilities 
and services have to be accessible to everyone without discrimination.”226 
Accessibility means both physical accessibility and economic accessibility.227 
Community participation in water decisions is also important, particularly 
where these various goals might be in tension with SDWA’s primary focus on 
water quality risks undermining affordability, particularly in smaller systems. 
The emphasis on technical solutions also risks overemphasizing expertise and 
drowning out community voices.228 
For even smaller systems, those too small to be covered by the SDWA at 
all, the burden to provide clean water is even more acute. About 14% of the 
U.S. population relies on individual systems serving a single household or 
shared systems serving fifteen or fewer households.229 About 23% of these 
well systems have some degree of chemical contamination, and 34% tested 
positive for total coliforms.230 Although there is no national data on the 
demographics served by these wells, there have been “several case studies of 
low income and minority communities in rural agricultural areas that relied on 
groundwater that had high levels of nitrates or other agricultural chemicals.”231 
These communities fall through the cracks of both CWA and SDWA.  
Even where the burdens of agricultural water pollution are not borne 
disproportionately by low income and minority communities, there is some 
reason to think that the SDWA/CWA’s allocation of costs is nevertheless 
unfairly arbitrary. The SDWA/CWA interplay establishes a deviation from the 
polluter pays principle, reassigning a portion of agricultural pollution costs 
from their generators to a subset of those within the ambit of the pollution. The 
CWA’s treatment of agricultural water pollution functions as a congressional 
stamp of approval on what would, under other circumstances, be deemed a 
                                                                                                                     
at 2 (1995) (noting that one goal of the 1996 amendments was to make compliance more 
affordable for small water systems). 
 225 Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 15 (2002): The 
Right to Water (Arts. 11 and 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights), ¶ 12(a)–(c), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003) (saying the 
adequacy of water is part of the right to water). 
 226 Id. 
 227 Id. ¶ 12(c) (listing nondiscrimination as another critical attribute of accessibility).  
 228 Amy Vanderwarker, Water and Environmental Justice, in A TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY U.S. WATER POLICY 52, 55 (Juliet Christian-Smith et al. eds., 2012) (“A heavy 
reliance and emphasis on ‘engineering’ solutions to water problems, such as dams, has 
emphasized technological skills rather than community voices or local consequences.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 229 VanDerslice, supra note 216, at S111 (relying on U.S. Geological Survey data). 
 230 Id. 
 231 Id. (describing studies of the Yakima Valley in Washington State and of migrant 
agricultural labor camps around the country). 
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market failure requiring a regulatory response. This point serves as a common 
critique of the CWA and does not require much additional explication here. 
What is important to note, however, is the added peculiarity of how this 
“legalized externality” interacts with the SDWA, which assigns the cost of a 
subset of this pollution to water drinkers. 
Where point source pollution is the primary threat to safe water, this 
allocation of cost and responsibility is reasonable. Water utilities have a lighter 
burden; they are simply providing a backstop to ensure that water, whose 
content is often already heavily policed under the Clean Water Act, is safe to 
drink. Even where that system breaks down, where point source pollution 
contaminates drinking water, there are robust mechanisms, external to SDWA, 
to seek pollution abatement.232 By contrast, where nonpoint source pollution is 
the primary threat, the water utility is the first line of defense.  
The polluter pays is a widely used governing principle in environmental 
law, but there are often rational reasons to deviate from this principle.233 For 
instance, where the polluter is producing a needed resource and application of 
the principle would make that resource inaccessible, it may make more sense 
to ask those benefiting from the production of the resource to pay. In other 
circumstances, polluter pays may be normatively desirable but not cost 
effective to implement.  
The critical question here is whether there is a rational basis for treating 
farmers differently than other water polluters or whether this differential 
treatment is arbitrary. Commentators have identified a number of potential 
reasons for treating farmers differently.234 These include normative reasons, 
such as the special status of the family farmer,235 as well as practical reasons, 
including the sheer number of potential regulated entities,236 variation in 
                                                                                                                     
 232 The most important of these is the Clean Water Act citizen suit, which allows any 
individual, organization, or local government, including, if it so desired, a water utility, to 
bring an enforcement action against point sources not in compliance with the Act’s 
requirements. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2012). 
 233 See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal Environmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1495, 1552 (1999) (characterizing the principle as “the central rule of domestic 
environmental regimes the world over”); Jonathan Remy Nash, Too Much Market? 
Conflict Between Tradable Pollution Allowances and the “Polluter Pays” Principle, 24 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 465, 466 (2000) (describing the polluter pays principle as “a 
normative doctrine of environmental law” that “stems from the fundamental, logical, and 
fair proposition that those who generate pollution, not the government, should bear 
pollution costs”). 
 234 E.g., Schneider, supra note 191, at 937–43 (summarizing historical and normative 
explanations for special treatment). 
 235 Id.; see also Chen & Adams, supra note 114, at 371–73. 
 236 See Ruhl, supra note 8, at 329 (explaining that the number of farms along with their 
geographic distribution and diversity make them difficult to regulate). As of the most 
recent agricultural census, there are approximately 2.1 million farms. NAT’L AGRIC. 
STATISTICS SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ACH12-3, 2012 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE 
HIGHLIGHTS: FARM DEMOGRAPHICS: U.S. FARMERS BY GENDER, AGE, RACE, ETHNICITY, 
AND MORE (May 2014), http://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2012/Online_Resourc 
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farming practices and local environmental conditions,237 and technical 
challenges with traceability and measurability of water contamination.238 
Environmental law scholars have ably rejected these concerns, arguing 
persuasively that it is time to bring agriculture under regulation.239  
Although there is ample political and cultural explanation for the statutory 
allocation of costs, there is little rational basis. Deviation from the polluter 
pays principle in this instance creates a discrepancy between water users who 
live near industrial agricultural operations and those who do not. A water 
utility (and its ratepayers) who are adjacent to polluting agricultural lands are 
in a worse position than those water utilities who are adjacent only to point 
sources of pollution. The water utility is bearing the costs of a public policy to 
keep food cheap, making water more expensive as a result. 
This is, of course, one of many geographical factors affecting water rates. 
Other, perhaps more significant, deviations follow from availability of water 
and need for infrastructure to transport water long distances. The size of a 
community also has a large effect on water rates; in smaller communities 
water may be significantly more expensive as infrastructure and operation 
costs are distributed over a smaller number of ratepayers. It is not necessarily 
the case that water should cost the same everywhere. Indeed, it might be 
rational to charge less for water in water-rich places than in water-poor places, 
where higher rates might incentivize more efficient use of a scarce resource.240 
                                                                                                                     
es/Highlights/Farm_Demographics/Highlights_Farm_Demographics.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
6JWY-RHGJ]. Compare this to about 500 coal-fired power plants. Table 4.1. Count of 
Electric Power Industry Power Plants, by Sector, by Predominant Energy Sources Within 
Plant, 2005 Through 2015, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Nov. 21, 2016), 
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/html/epa_04_01.html [https://perma.cc/M38F-
QKFV]. Tools such as general permitting and potential carve outs for low risk categories 
of farms could make this number more manageable. See infra Part IV.B.1 (calling for use 
of these tools to craft sensible regulation of agriculture industry). 
 237 Farms pose varying levels of risk to public water supplies depending on a broad 
range of variables including proximity to source water, topography, soil permeability, crop 
types, and rainfall. See Ruhl, supra note 8, at 329–30 (identifying variables). Perfect 
tailoring to these conditions would be extremely costly for regulators.  
 238 See Margot J. Pollans, Regulating Farming: Balancing Food Safety and 
Environmental Protection in a Cooperative Governance Regime, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
399, 411 & n.47 (2015). For much agricultural nonpoint source pollution, there is no 
emissions point from which to measure pollution output. See id. Much of agricultural water 
pollution, however, looks a lot like traditional point source pollution. See id. This is 
particularly true where irrigation and stormwater runoff are channelized in drainage and 
irrigation systems before being returned to source water. See id. at 404 n.20, 411 & n.47. 
Further, improved testing and monitoring technology may help regulators overcome 
measurement problems.  
 239 See supra notes 8–9 (citing sources). 
 240 See generally, e.g., OLIVER M. BRANDES ET AL., WORTH EVERY PENNY: A PRIMER 
ON CONSERVATION-ORIENTED WATER PRICING (May 2010), http://poliswaterproject.org/sit 
es/default/files/Pricing%20Primer%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2WE-653J]. Many 
municipalities are, however, limited by state statutory and constitutional law in their 
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In the case of proximity to agricultural operations, however, the same logic 
does not apply. The benefits of cheap food are distributed across all food 
consumers.241 There is no good reason to concentrate the cost on adjacent 
communities. 
B. Cost Shifting v. Pollution Prevention 
These concerns challenge two aspects of the current regulatory scheme: 
(1) the default point of cleanup: centralized end-of-line purification rather than 
on farm pollution prevention; and (2) the assignment of cleanup costs to 
drinking water consumers (and to a lesser extent to tax payers) rather than to 
farmers and food consumers.  
Both are problematic in various ways. The default point of cleanup creates 
inefficiencies not only because earlier cleanup can sometimes be cheaper but 
also because earlier cleanup can generate other kinds of benefits beyond safe 
drinking water. Assignment of the cleanup duty to water utilities, with narrow 
geographic jurisdiction and expertise, further entrenches the default. 
Assignment of cleanup costs to water utilities (and thus to ratepayers) 
generates equity concerns.  
One potential way forward would be to create a liability rule allowing 
utilities to recover cleanup costs from farmers. The rule would look like a 
pollution tax imposed by water utilities on farmers. Such a rule would resolve 
the equity concerns described above and would force internalization of a 
subset of the environmental harms of agriculture. The rule, would however, be 
difficult to implement. Although it is possible to estimate the costs that 
agriculture imposes on drinking water systems, it is extremely difficult to 
determine how those costs should be allocated among various farmers on a 
watershed.242  
Further, a rational rule would allow a farmer to choose between paying her 
proportionate share of end-of-line cleanup costs and modifying her farming 
                                                                                                                     
discretion to set prices; some states have cost-of-service restrictions prohibiting utilities 
from charging any more than the cost of service. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XIIID, § 4(a) 
(establishing that utilities may not impose charges on a parcel that “exceed[] the reasonable 
cost of the proportional special benefit conferred on that parcel”). 
 241 Many economists also argue that the narrative of cheap food has been vastly 
oversold. Although agriculture commodity prices are low, the primary beneficiaries are 
food distributors and processors, not consumers. FOOD & WATER WATCH & PUB. HEALTH 
INST., DO FARM SUBSIDIES CAUSE OBESITY? DISPELLING COMMON MYTHS ABOUT PUBLIC 
HEALTH AND THE FARM BILL 7–9 (Oct. 2011), http://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/sites/def 
ault/files/Farm%20Subsidies%20Obesity%20Report%20Oct%202011.pdf [https://perma.c 
c/XH7U-D6YV]; see also infra notes 259–64 and accompanying text (arguing that cheap 
food is not a justification for expensive water). 
 242 See generally Victor B. Flatt, C(r)ap and Trade: The Brave New World of Non-
Point Source Nutrient Trading and Using Lessons from Greenhouse Gas Markets to Make 
It Work, 52 HOUS. L. REV. 301 (2014) (describing the challenges to implementing water 
pollution cap and trade schemes at the watershed level). 
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practices to reduce her share of the contamination. Without this option, the 
rule would not incentivize modified farmer behavior and would thus not 
generate any of the ancillary benefits following from pollution reduction. But 
this choice complicates the allocation of costs because the water utility’s total 
costs are not necessarily directly proportional to the volume of a contaminant.  
Consider the following stylized example. A municipality maintains a 
facility to manage nitrate levels in the water supply. It pays a flat rate of 
$5,000 for any day that the facility is in operation, and it must operate the 
facility on any day when nitrate contamination exceeds five parts per million 
(ppm).243 The facility has the capacity to reduce nitrate levels to below five 
ppm no matter how high the initial level. There are fifty farmers in the region 
who each contribute 1/50 of the total nitrates, and thus each pay $100 for each 
day the facility is in operation. In most years, there are fifty exceedence days 
per year (about the number of rainy days), so each farmer can expect to pay 
$5,000 annually.  
Twenty of these farmers can get their nitrate pollution down to de minimis 
levels for less than $5,000, so they opt to do that rather than pay. This reduces 
the total amount of nitrate pollution by 2/5, but does not necessarily reduce the 
number of exceedence days. Imagine that the average level on an exceedence 
day before those ten farmers changed their practices was twenty ppm.244 This 
amount is now reduced by 2/5 to twelve ppm, which is still greater than the 
allowed level.  
Now the municipality has to charge the remaining farmers a much larger 
share ($166.66/exceedence day or $8,333.33/year).245 Assuming it chooses the 
latter, this would trigger a second round of opting out, as a larger group of 
farmers would now find it less expensive to change their practices than to pay 
the $8,333.33. This would continue on until the total nitrate pollution level 
decreased by 75% (to bring the average exceedence from twenty ppm to below 
five ppm), which would occur after at least thirty-eight farmers changed their 
practices.246 The remaining twelve farmers would be free to continue their 
existing practices and would not have to pay because there would be no more 
exceedence days.247 
                                                                                                                     
 243 Assume that this maximum contamination level, if achieved by pollution reduction 
rather than purification, is set at the correct level to maximize net benefits including both 
benefits of drinking water purity and ancillary benefits as described in Part III.A.1 above. 
 244 This hypothetical assumes it is not possible for a farmer to make a partial reduction. 
 245 Another possibility is that the municipality make up the cost difference itself, but if 
it did so, nitrate pollution would not be reduced further because farmers would have no 
additional reduction incentive and only some of the ancillary benefits of reduction would 
be achieved.  
 246 The 75% reduction is reached once 37.5 farmers change their practices, but I have 
rounded up as I am assuming that a half reduction is not possible. 
 247 Compare this to a carbon tax, under which those firms who choose to continue 
polluting will always have to pay in proportion to what they pollute. Nathan Richardson & 
Arthur G. Fraas, Comparing the Clean Air Act and a Carbon Price, 44 ENVTL. L. REP. 
NEWS & ANALYSIS 10472, 10476 (2014) (describing basic structure of a carbon tax). Here, 
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A municipality seeking to avoid this iterative pricing process might 
attempt to determine farmer pollution reduction costs up front and price the tax 
accordingly, but would only be able to do so if each farmer accurately 
disclosed her costs. The farmers would have an incentive to overestimate their 
costs as the twelve with the highest costs could ultimately avoid any payment 
at all. The municipality would have difficulty verifying the farmers’ assertions 
as to their costs. Requiring the final twelve to help offset the reduction costs of 
the first thirty-eight might resolve this concern, but would further complicate 
the information gathering and cost allocation process. 
A real world scenario would of course be vastly more complicated than 
this hypothetical as farms would contribute varying levels of pollution and 
establishing causation would be costly.248 A liability rule in this context thus 
might address both the equity and efficiency concerns raised in Part II.A 
above, but would itself impose significant transaction costs (even in the 
simplified model) that might undermine the effectiveness of the system.249  
A liability rule might also raise a different set of equity concerns for 
farmers under production contracts. Many farmers also lack the authority to 
make significant changes to their production practices because those practices 
are dictated in precise detail by production contracts that farmers enter into 
with buyers—including food processors, food distributors, and food 
retailers.250 In some industries, as much as 84% of the commodity is produced 
under production contracts.251 These farmers might not be able to change their 
production practices to avoid liability, even where the change would be less 
expensive than paying for end-of-line cleanup. 
                                                                                                                     
farms would not continue to pay because the purpose of the tax is to cover water 
purification costs. Once water purification costs are zero, there is no reason to continuing 
charging the tax. 
 248 Establishing causation would be difficult for the same reasons that implementing 
NPDES permitting would be difficult. See supra notes 236–38 and accompanying text 
(explaining the practical challenges to applying standard NPDES permitting to farms). 
 249 The real world scenario is further complicated by the fact that farms are not the 
only source of nonpoint source pollution. See OFFICE OF WETLANDS, OCEANS & 
WATERSHEDS, supra note 34, at 8 & fig.A-1. 
 250 See Christopher R. Kelley, Agricultural Production Contracts: Drafting 
Considerations, 18 HAMLINE L. REV. 397, 397–98 (1995). Production contracts are 
agreements for growing crops, poultry, and livestock that 
typically contain provisions covering the crop’s entire production process, often 
specifying planting periods, husbandry practices, and other matters intended to ensure 
delivery of a certain quality and quantity of the crop to the purchaser. Livestock and 
poultry production contracts also typically specify the standards that must be satisfied 
during the production period covered by the contract. 
Id. at 397. 
 251 James M. MacDonald, Trends in Agricultural Contracts, CHOICES, 3d Quarter 
2015, at 1, 3 tbl.1, http://www.choicesmagazine.org/UserFiles/file/cmsarticle_461.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B5ET-74YS] (stating that 84% of poultry, 74% of hogs, 57% of peanuts, 
and 50% of fruits, nuts, and berries are under production contracts). 
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A second, and preferable, option would be to switch the default rule from 
end-of-line purification to pollution prevention. Such a property rule would 
require that farmers reduce their pollution levels but leaves open the 
possibility that, in at least some circumstances, water utilities should continue 
to pay for prevention costs. A property rule would ensure the full range of 
benefits including drinking water benefits and ancillary benefits, but would 
allow flexibility to allocate costs fairly.  
There are a few reasons to think that farmers might not be in the best 
position to bear the cost of pollution reduction. First, most farmers are price 
takers.252 In other words, they can sell at the price set by the market or not at 
all. They cannot charge more even if their costs increase. To the extent that 
certain categories of farmers produce essential goods but would not be 
economically viable if required to cover the cost of water pollution, then some 
cost spreading may be desirable.  
Second, larger water utility systems, which have the ability to spread costs 
over a large number of ratepayers, may be better positioned than farmers to 
absorb increased costs.253 In these circumstances, farmers should reduce their 
pollution, but water utilities, and thus municipal water users, should contribute 
all or part of the cost.254  
By contrast, smaller water systems, particularly those in low-income rural 
areas, are not well positioned to bear the costs of pollution prevention. In these 
systems, even small increases in overall system costs may lead to significant 
per user increases that quickly exceed standards for water affordability.255 For 
these smaller systems shifting all or even some pollution prevention costs to 
ratepayers would raise environmental justice concerns, and costs should be 
borne by the water utility only if covered by federal grant and thus spread out 
over all taxpayers.256 
A pollution prevention default should also remain exactly that, a default. 
The juxtaposition of agriculture with drinking water systems raises an 
important question about the compatibility of food production and source 
                                                                                                                     
 252 See Robert J. Myers et al., A Century of Research on Agricultural Markets, 92 AM. 
J. AGRIC. ECON. 376, 378 (2010) (summarizing existing research and describing effects of 
competition and consolidation at the processing level).  
 253 This is a pragmatic idea that beneficiaries of environmental benefits such as clean 
water should, if in a position to do so, contribute to the maintenance of that benefit.  
 254 This is an application of Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed’s “rule four.” 
See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1116–23 (1972). Under 
this rule, the municipal water utility has an entitlement to be free from agricultural water 
pollution, but must pay to exercise it. See id. at 1116. 
 255 See supra notes 226–29 and accompanying text (describing the affordability 
measure and explaining its significance). 
 256 Of course, a rule that determined cost allocation on the basis of ability to pay and 
capacity for cost spreading would itself be costly to implement. State-level management to 
determine when to shift costs could help. See infra Part IV.B.3.b.i (calling for more robust 
state source water protection and nonpoint source pollution controls). 
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water protection. Even agriculture with the best environmental stewardship 
may not always be compatible with source water protection.257 An absolute 
rule would suggest that where there is a fundamental incompatibility, drinking 
water should win out, and agriculture should be suspended in that area. But 
such an inflexible rule ignores the importance of food production. Fertile land 
is itself a limited resource, and where prime farmland and source water are 
adjacent to one another, reliance on end-of-line cleanup rather than complete 
pollution prevention may be preferable.  
Further, it will not always be true that pollution prevention will be less 
expensive than end-of-line cleanup. Particularly where farmers have already 
implemented some pollution prevention measures, imposing additional 
pollution prevention obligations may exceed the combined cost of end-of-line 
cleanup and other collateral consequences of pollution. In such circumstances, 
the default should shift. 
Nevertheless improving environmental stewardship, even where it would 
not eliminate the need for end-of-line clean up, should remain the goal, 
relegating end-of-line clean up to its more appropriate role of fail safe measure 
rather than first line of defense. The question remains as to what types of 
regulatory tools can most effectively achieve this shift. Part IV takes up that 
question. 
IV. ESTABLISHING A MITIGATION NORM 
Water utilities facing rising compliance costs are not without options. 
Indeed, in some narrow circumstances, existing environmental law provides 
utilities a cause of action against farms. Although none of these litigation 
options shift the status quo end-of-line clean up to pollution prevention, they 
can shift obligations between particular water systems and their neighboring 
farms.  
This Part begins with an exploration of those options, concluding that they 
may provide limited relief, particularly where plaintiffs can identify 
defendants other than farmers, but, as a whole, they are inadequate to protect 
the efficiency and equity interests identified in Part II.A above. Instead, a new 
approach is necessary. The interaction between the SDWA and the CWA must 
be understood in the broader context of the food system. The agriculture 
industry has been very successful at curbing federal environmental 
regulation.258 Among the industry’s wide-ranging rhetoric is the argument that 
                                                                                                                     
 257 In other words, in many places the only way to obtain a filtration avoidance 
certificate may be to suspend agriculture all together.  
 258 See MEGAN STUBBS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41622, ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATION AND AGRICULTURE 15 (2014), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41622.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H8CH-PP67]. 
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meager regulation generates the benefit of cheap food, which all enjoy.259 But 
letting agriculture generate environmental externalities in the name of cheap 
food is less justifiable—if it was ever justifiable—if the spillover cost is 
expensive water.260  
Scientists have long recognized the importance of watershed level 
management, and interjurisdictional fighting over responsibility for source 
water protection hinders efforts at cooperation that is essential to that 
management. Although states may be well-positioned to engage in watershed 
level management, water utilities with the primary responsibility for provision 
of clean drinking water are not. The best way forward involves both 
empowering water utilities to adequately protect their source waters and 
revoking the special status of farms in environmental law. 
A. Requiring Mitigation Under Existing Law 
Part II.A described cost spreading tools built into the SDWA framework. 
These include state and federal funding for infrastructure development and 
technical support for both infrastructure development and source water 
management.261 But, in some narrow circumstances, cash-strapped water 
utilities have an additional option: litigation against source water polluters. 
This Part explores the scope of this option, considering the potential for suit 
under SDWA, the CWA, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA), and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act (CERCLA), and state nuisance and trespass law. Although 
these options might provide some financial relief or even force pollution 
prevention, the constraints on these litigation tools make them a limited 
option. They allow a move away from the default in a narrow set of extreme 
circumstances, but they do not change the default. This Part concludes that 
litigation may be a good option where water utilities can identify defendants, 
such as food processors or farm input manufacturers, who have the resources 
to cover water utility costs and the authority to make systemic changes in 
                                                                                                                     
 259 See, e.g., ANNE WEIR SCHECHINGER & CRAIG COX, ENVTL. WORKING GRP., 
FEEDING THE WORLD: THINK U.S. AGRICULTURE WILL END WORLD HUNGER? THING 
AGAIN 3 (Oct. 2016), https://static.ewg.org/reports/2016/feeding_the_world/EWG_Feeding 
TheWorld.pdf?_ga=1.267200973.2102012507.1485472875 [https://perma.cc/Y3UT-
XJWM]; see also Chen & Adams, supra note 114, at 377 (identifying the status of the 
family farm as another justification for current legal treatment of agriculture). 
 260 Another way to think about this is that water contamination is itself a food safety 
issue. Water safety law thus suffers from a similar critical flaw as the recent food safety 
modernization. Neither statute adequately addresses sources of cross contamination. Just as 
SDWA provides no mechanism to address nonpoint source pollution, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f–
300g (2012), the Food Safety Modernization Act provides inadequate mechanisms to 
protect leafy greens and other fresh produce from contaminated runoff from concentrated 
animal feeding operations, see FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, 
124 Stat. 3885 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).  
 261 See supra Part II.A. 
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farming practices. Where such a defendant is not available, however, litigation 
is less desirable. 
1. SDWA Citizen Suits and Imminent and Substantial Endangerment 
Suits 
SDWA provides for three types of enforcement litigation: citizen suits 
against water utilities for failure to comply with state and federal 
requirements,262 citizen suits against the EPA for failure to fulfill statutory 
obligations,263 and EPA suits against firms and individuals whose actions pose 
“an imminent and substantial endangerment” to drinking water.264 Only this 
third category serves to impose pollution prevention obligations on farmers.  
SDWA limits the authority to bring endangerment suits to the EPA itself. 
Neither states, nor water utilities, nor water users may bring these suits.265 The 
original purpose of the provision was to provide a federal backstop where state 
and local authorities were not taking adequate action to protect the public 
health.266  
Endangerment suits also suffer from several other limitations. First is the 
EPA’s limited resources.267 Indeed, the EPA brings only a handful of these 
suits per year.268 Second is the standard for making a claim. Although courts 
reviewing administrative orders apply an arbitrary and capricious standard, 
                                                                                                                     
 262 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8. 
 263 Id. 
 264 Id. § 300i(a) (giving the EPA authority to enjoin activities “upon receipt of 
information that a contaminant which is present in or is likely to enter a public water 
system or an underground source of drinking water . . . which may present an imminent 
and substantial endangerment to the health of persons”). 
 265 See id. Perhaps one justification for withholding this authority from states is that 
states are free to regulate source water contamination by other means. See infra 
Part IV.B.3.b.i (discussing potential for expanded state law regulation in this area). Indeed, 
four states—Alabama, Maryland, Montana, and Wyoming—have delegated authority to 
their environmental agencies to bring enforcement actions against farms that pollute water 
bodies in violation of state water quality standards, but the relevant agencies in all four 
states have declined to exercise that power, instead presenting farms with a range of 
voluntary pollution reduction measures. See CRAIG & NOTO, supra note 167, at 8. 
 266 H.R. REP. NO. 93-1185, at 35 (1974) (explaining inclusion of the statutory 
requirement that the EPA Administrator exercise his emergency powers only on a finding 
that state and local entities were taking no adequate action to protect the public health), as 
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6454, 6486–87. 
 267 David L. Markell & Robert L. Glicksman, Dynamic Governance in Theory and 
Application, Part I, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 563, 594–603 (2016) (explaining that the EPA’s 
budget declined over a period in which its responsibilities increased significantly). 
 268 The EPA’s online docket database shows about five emergency administrative 
orders per year, but this database in not complete. See generally EPA Administrative 
Enforcement Dockets: Dockets by Statute SDWA, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
https://yosemite.epa.gov/oa/rhc/epaadmin.nsf/Dockets+By+Statute?OpenView&RestrictTo
Category=SDWA [https://perma.cc/NBB9-JYHR] (last updated Nov. 26, 2016). 
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they impose a heavy burden on the Agency to establish that there is a threat to 
health and that the ordered action will remedy that threat.269 Finally, while the 
EPA occasionally orders cleanup, its enforcement orders more often require 
monitoring, and, in the case of contamination, provision of alternate sources of 
water, such as bottled water.270  
Nevertheless, one recent prominent example demonstrates that, if 
employed strategically, this tool could be honed to curb agricultural nonpoint 
source pollution. In 2013, the EPA entered into a consent decree with five 
dairies in Yakima Valley, Washington.271 The EPA found that manure 
management practices at the dairies, including lagoon storage and field 
spraying, were contaminating local drinking water supplies and ordered the 
five dairies to provide alternative water sources to neighbors with private 
wells, establish monitoring programs, and adopt a number of specific manure 
management best practices.272 
Despite the potential of endangerment suits as a powerful regulatory tool 
in extreme instances, it is unlikely to lead to widespread change because of 
limitations on the EPA’s resources.273 The EPA simply cannot undertake a 
systematic campaign of suing farmers on drinking watersheds.  
2. CWA Citizen Suits 
Although the Clean Water Act provides a powerful litigation tool where 
contamination comes from CAFOs, which are considered point sources and 
thus subject to NPDES permitting requirements, litigation options related to 
nonpoint sources are extremely limited. Creative litigants are left with two 
options. First, if source drinking water is impaired in violation of state water 
quality standards and the state has not developed an adequate TMDL, a water 
utility could sue to force the state to do so.274 This is a limited remedy. Once 
                                                                                                                     
 269 United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 211 (3d Cir. 1982) (articulating the standard 
for issuing an injunction under 42 U.S.C. § 300i). But it is important to note that very few 
of these cases are ever challenged in court. A search in Westlaw for cases regarding 
imminent and substantial endangerment orders reveals only about ten cases. 
 270 See, e.g., Trinity Am. Corp. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 150 F.3d 389 (4th Cir. 
1998) (upholding an enforcement order requiring a polyurethane foam plant to engage in 
systematic water sampling in a three-fourth mile radius from its property and provide 
bottled water on the finding of contamination exceeding drinking water standards). Many 
also contain water boil advisories. See, e.g., Emergency Administrative Order, In re 
Mountain Vill. Parks, Inc., No. SDWA-08-2014-0008 (U.S. E.P.A. Region 8, Mar. 7, 
2014).  
 271 Administrative Order on Consent ¶ 1, In re Yakima Valley Dairies, No. SDWA-10-
2013-0080 (U.S. E.P.A. Region 10, Mar. 19, 2013). 
 272 Id. ¶¶ 10, 11, 13. 
 273 It may simply be that the EPA prefers to use other mechanisms to achieve cleanup. 
This could explain why the EPA has yet to issue an emergency administrative order to 
address the lead contamination crisis in Flint, Michigan. 
 274 Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123, 1124 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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the TMDL is in place, the CWA provides no mechanism for its 
enforcement.275  
A TMDL may, however, provide a vehicle for development of enforceable 
state pollution reduction plans. For instance, in developing the Chesapeake 
Bay TMDL, a multistate planning document aimed at reducing loads of 
nitrogen, phosphorous, and sediment throughout the Chesapeake Bay, the EPA 
required that states provide “reasonable assurance[s]” that target pollution 
reductions would be met.276 Explaining the “reasonable assurance” 
framework, the EPA says that, where a water body is impaired only by point 
sources,  
the existence of the [NPDES] regulatory program and the issuance of an 
NPDES permit provide the reasonable assurance that the [waste load 
allocations] in the TMDL will be achieved. . . .  
 
 [But] [w]here a TMDL is developed for waters impaired by both point 
and nonpoint sources, in EPA’s best professional judgment, determinations of 
reasonable assurance that the TMDL’s [load allocations] will be achieved 
could include whether practices capable of reducing the specified pollutant 
load: (1) exist; (2) are technically feasible . . . ; and (3) have a high likelihood 
of implementation.277  
The EPA was unsatisfied by those assurances regarding Pennsylvania 
urban stormwater and West Virginia agriculture, so “it imposed a ‘backstop 
adjustment,’ meaning that it will require greater reductions from point sources 
in Pennsylvania and West Virginia if those states cannot meet their projected 
load allocations.”278 Thus, while a TMDL itself may provide no enforceable 
mechanism for pollution reduction on farms, the TMDL process may lead to 
such reduction. 
Second, a water utility or citizen group could attempt to characterize as a 
point source a source that has historically been treated as a nonpoint source. 
Perhaps the best recent example of this phenomenon is the suit described in 
the introduction.279 Although the farms that are the source of drinking water 
contamination in Des Moines, Iowa are traditional nonpoint sources, they use 
tile drainage, a subsurface infrastructure designed to draw water away from the 
                                                                                                                     
 275 See Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 792 F.3d 281, 291 & n.4 
(3d Cir. 2015) (explaining that TMDLs are not self-executing documents, rather they are 
information tools to guide future pollution controls), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1246 (2016) 
(mem.). 
 276 Id. at 291–92. 
 277 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CHESAPEAKE BAY TMDL § 7.1 (Dec. 2010), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-12/documents/cbay_final_tmdl_section_7 
_final_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/RJ23-RY85]. 
 278 Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n, 792 F.3d at 292. 
 279 See supra Part I. 
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root zone.280 In its suit, the Des Moines Water Works sued not individual 
farmers but a group of thirteen drainage districts that collectively maintain the 
tile drainage system on behalf of farmers.281 The Des Moines Water Works 
charges that these drainage districts illegally “discharge nitrate pollution into 
Raccoon River” without a NPDES permit.282 The Water Works argues that tile 
drainage is a point source because it transports very little irrigation return 
flow.283 With regard to stormwater, the Water Works asserts that the 
stormwater is not responsible for significant amounts of nitrate leaching.284 
Instead, the drainage system itself, which “artificially lowers the water table 
by removing water from the saturated zone and expanding the volume of soil 
in which mineralization of organic matter, including plant residues and 
manure[,] can generate nitrate in the unsaturated zone.”285 In other words, the 
water carrying nitrates into the Raccoon River is naturally occurring 
groundwater. According to the complaint, because neither irrigation return 
flow nor storm water runoff is the primary mechanism of nitrogen transport 
from farm fields to the Raccoon River, the Clean Water Act’s agricultural 
carveout does not apply, and the only question is whether the drainage system 
creates a “discrete conveyance.”286  
If this novel claim succeeds, it could change the landscape for regulation 
of agricultural water pollution and provide a model for other water utilities 
around the country. A holding favorable to the Des Moines Water Works 
would, however, be limited by some of the essential facts of this case: The 
                                                                                                                     
 280 See generally DON HOFSTRAND, IOWA STATE UNIV. EXTENSION & OUTREACH, 
UNDERSTANDING THE ECONOMICS OF TILE DRAINAGE (July 2010), https://www.extension.ia 
state.edu/agdm/wholefarm/pdf/c2-90.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HFE-QEHD]. 
 281 Bd. of Water Works Complaint, supra note 4, ¶ 1. 
 282 Id. The Complaint also states claims for public nuisance, id. ¶¶ 217–233, statutory 
nuisance, id. ¶¶ 234–241, private nuisance, id. ¶¶ 242–245, trespass, id. ¶¶ 246–252, 
negligence, id. ¶¶ 253–261, inverse condemnation, id. ¶¶ 262–275, and violation of the 
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, id. ¶¶ 276–282. 
 283 Id. ¶ 135. 
 284 Id. ¶ 152. 
 285 Id. ¶ 147. Nitrate is a byproduct of decomposition of organic matter. Chapter 1, The 
Decomposition Process, TEX. A&M AGRILIFE EXTENSION, http://aggie-horticulture.tamu.e 
du/earthkind/landscape/dont-bag-it/chapter-1-the-decomposition-process/ [https://perma.cc 
/PTL7-WAT9] (last revised Feb. 2009). 
 286 Bd. of Water Works Complaint, supra note 4, ¶¶ 145–147, 160–167; see also 33 
U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2012) (defining point source). In a recent case in the U.S. District 
Court for the Eastern District of California, a district court judge rejected a similar 
argument, finding that the tile drainage was an integral part of the irrigation system and 
that tile drainage discharges constituted irrigation return flows except to the extent they 
channelized waters “not related to crop production.” Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s 
Ass’ns v. Glaser, No. CIV S-2:11-2980-KJM-CKD, 2013 WL 5230266, at *12, *16 (E.D. 
Cal. Sept. 16, 2013). Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Associations can potentially 
be distinguished on the ground that the fields in the Des Moines drainage districts are not 
irrigated. See Bd. of Water Works Complaint, supra note 4, ¶¶ 178, 212. 
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agricultural region is dependent on tile drainage systems,287 and the water 
flowing through those systems is primarily existing groundwater.288  
3. The Toxic and Solid Waste Statutes 
The RCRA governs the storage, transportation, and disposal of solid and 
hazardous waste.289 Historically, it has had little import for agriculture because 
most agricultural pollutants are not characterized as hazardous and are thus not 
subject to the statute’s permitting requirements290 and because many normal 
farming practices are exempt from the statute’s solid waste open dumping 
prohibition.291  
A recent case, however, expands RCRA’s reach onto farms. In Community 
Association for Restoration of the Environment, Inc. v. Cow Palace, a suit 
involving some of the same dairies as the Yakima Valley endangerment suit 
described in Part III.A.1 above, a District Court in Washington State held that 
manure application could be subject to RCRA requirements.292 The case 
                                                                                                                     
 287 Tile drainage is common in states in the Mississippi River Basin. Although limited 
data exists, USDA data suggests that in some states as much as 50% of cropland has 
subsurface drainage systems. ZACHARY SUGG, WORLD RES. INST., ASSESSING U.S. FARM 
DRAINAGE: CAN GIS LEAD TO BETTER ESTIMATES OF SUBSURFACE DRAINAGE EXTENT? 5 
(2007), http://www.wri.org/sites/default/files/pdf/assessing_farm_drainage.pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/NG37-FW5P]. For maps of areas reliant on tile drainage, see D.B. JAYNES & D.E. 
JAMES, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., THE EXTENT OF FARM DRAINAGE IN THE UNITES STATES 
figs.2, 3, 4, 5 & 6, http://www.ars.usda.gov/SP2UserFiles/Place/50301500/TheExtentofFar 
mDrainageintheUnitedStates.pdf [https://perma.cc/FTK2-FENU]. 
 288 The trial is scheduled for summer 2017. Bd. of Water Works Trs. v. Sac Cty. Bd. of 
Supervisors, No. 5:15-cv-04020 (N.D. Iowa May 12, 2016) (order resetting bench trial, 
final pretrial conference, and requirements for the proposed final pretrial order). Motions 
for summary judgment are currently pending.  
 289 42 U.S.C. § 6902 (2012) (explaining the objectives and policies of the RCRA).  
 290 See 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(b)(2) (2015) (excluding from the definition of hazardous 
waste any harvested agricultural crops or animal manures that are “returned to the soils as 
fertilizers”).  
 291 Irrigation return flows are expressly excluded from the definition of solid waste. 42 
U.S.C. § 6903(27); 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(a)(3); see also Ruhl, supra note 8, at 314 (describing 
additional RCRA exemptions for normal farming activities). For an example of a water 
utility suing an upstream polluter under RCRA outside of the agricultural context, see Little 
Hocking Water Ass’n v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 91 F. Supp. 3d 940, 953–55 (S.D. 
Ohio 2015), which held that the water district had standing to pursue a RCRA claim. 
 292 Cmty. Ass’n for Restoration of the Env’t, Inc. v. Cow Palace, LLC, 80 F. Supp. 3d 
1180, 1225 (E.D. Wash. 2015) (“[N]o reasonable trier of fact, upon reviewing the record 
here, could dispute that Defendants’ excessive application of manure onto agricultural 
fields, untethered to the [Dairy Nutrient Management Plan] or the fertilization needs of the 
crops; and storage and composting of manure in ways that result in dangerous 
accumulations of nitrate in the environment, transformed its manure, an otherwise 
beneficial and useful product, into a discarded material and thus a RCRA solid waste.”), 
motion to certify appeal denied, No. 2:13-CV-3016-TOR, 2015 WL 403178 (E.D. Wash. 
Jan. 28, 2015). 
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turned on the central question of whether manure held in lagoons or applied to 
fields was “discarded” and could thus be characterized as solid waste.293 The 
court held that, where manure application exceeded a field’s carrying capacity 
(in other words, when too much was applied), it did indeed constitute solid 
waste.294 The court also held that the Dairy’s manure management practices 
constituted a “substantial and imminent endangerment” to health or the 
environment.295 The court reserved remedial issues for trial,296 and the parties 
subsequently settled on that question.297  
Cow Palace provides a road map for both water utilities and 
environmental NGOs seeking to curtail manure-related farm excesses.298 
Robust use of RCRA suits could play an important role in addressing nitrate 
(and other manure-related) contamination in drinking water, but it has no 
direct bearing on contamination from other types of farming practices. Further, 
because the burden of proof lies with the plaintiff to establish that manure 
application exceeds standards of care, such suits do not switch the default rule 
from end-of-line cleanup to pollution prevention.  
Like RCRA, CERCLA has not traditionally been a powerful legal tool to 
respond to farm-related contamination. The statute “does not impose liability 
for any response costs resulting from application of FIFRA-registered 
pesticides, and excludes the ‘normal application of fertilizer’ from remediation 
and liability provisions.”299 Some courts have, however, suggested that 
excessive application would not be “normal.”300 
                                                                                                                     
 293 Id. at 1187. 
 294 Id. at 1224. The court also examined the other criteria required to find that the 
Dairy was engaged in illegal open dumping, and found either that they were met or that 
there were genuine issues of material fact to be addressed at trial. Id. at 1218–19, 1225–27 
(laying out the elements of an open dumping claim and finding that the Dairy was 
contaminating the environment “beyond the solid waste boundary” (quoting 40 C.F.R. 
§ 257.3-4(a))). 
 295 Id. at 1230. 
 296 Id. 
 297 [Proposed] Consent Decree at 2, Cmty. Ass’n for Restoration of the Env’t, Inc. v. 
Cow Palace, LLC, No. CV-13-3016-TOR (E.D. Wash. May 11, 2015). 
 298 But as the case itself demonstrates, repetition may be an uphill battle. Both the 
plaintiffs and the court relied heavily on the existence of the EPA’s prior emergency 
administrative order, which provided much of the data and the endangerment finding upon 
which plaintiffs rested their claim. E.g., Cow Palace, 80 F. Supp. 3d at 1199, 1202–03, 
1210, 1216. 
 299 Ruhl, supra note 8, at 315 (footnote omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) 
(1994)) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(i)). 
 300 See, e.g., City of Tulsa v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1287–88, 1287 
n.15 (N.D. Okla. 2003) (discussing a Senate Report explaining that the exclusion for the 
“normal field application” of fertilizer refers to “the act of putting fertilizer on crops or 
cropland, and does not mean any dumping, spilling, or emitting, whether accidental or 
intentional, in any other place or of significantly greater concentrations or amounts than are 
beneficial to crops” (quoting S. REP. NO. 96-848, at 46 (1980))), vacated pursuant to 
settlement (July 16, 2003); see also City of Waco v. Schouten, 385 F. Supp. 2d 595, 602 
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4. State Law Nuisance and Trespass Actions 
In addition to the above-described federal statutory causes of action, water 
utilities may also be able to bring state nuisance and trespass actions.301 For 
example, in City of Tulsa v. Tyson Foods, Inc., Tulsa, Oklahoma sued various 
poultry processors claiming that poultry waste from factory farms was 
contaminating the drinking water supply and alleging intentional nuisance and 
trespass.302 Although the decision was ultimately vacated due to a settlement, 
the Northern District of Oklahoma held that the water utility had a property 
interest in its source water and the right, as a public agency, to bring a public 
nuisance claim on behalf of the residents of Tulsa.303 
                                                                                                                     
(W.D. Tex. 2005) (concluding that release of fertilizer into waterways resulting from 
“improperly stor[ing] large amounts of [animal] waste . . . and . . . fail[ing] to properly 
maintain these waste storage areas” would not be “normal application of fertilizer”). 
 301 Some state common law actions may be preempted. For instance, in Feikema v. 
Texaco, Inc., the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a federal consent order 
requiring the defendant to take remedial action to address imminent and substantial 
endangerment pursuant to the RCRA preempted a state common law cause of action 
seeking injunctive relief for the same endangerment, but not an action seeking damages. 
Feikema v. Texaco, Inc., 16 F.3d 1408, 1418 (4th Cir. 1994). The federal Clean Water Act 
does not preempt state common law claims. Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellete, 479 U.S. 481, 500 
(1987). The statute does, however, preempt interstate suits brought under federal common 
law. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 327–29 (1981) (holding that the Clean 
Water Act preempted interstate nuisance claims under federal common law). Interstate 
suits, by state or private parties, can be brought under state law provided that they are 
brought under the law of the source state. See id. (holding that the Clean Water Act 
preempted the common law of an affected state where that state, or a citizen of that state, 
attempts to impose liability on a point source in another state).  
 302 Tyson Foods, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 1270. There are numerous other examples, many 
of which involve chemical companies and manufacturers. See, e.g., Suffolk Cty. Water 
Auth. v. Dow Chem. Co., 991 N.Y.S.2d 613, 618 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014) (denying motions 
for summary judgment). 
 303 Tyson Foods, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 1289–90; see also Schouten, 385 F. Supp. 2d at 
604 (finding the plaintiff’s allegation that the defendant dairies had polluted Lake Waco, 
diminishing drinking water quality and increasing the costs of treating that water, sufficient 
to state claims of negligence per se and trespass). The Des Moines Water Works also 
alleged a variety of state law claims including statutory nuisance, private nuisance, public 
nuisance, and trespass as part of its complaint against neighboring agricultural irrigation 
districts. See Bd. of Water Works Complaint, supra note 4, ¶¶ 233, 241, 245, 252. In 
January 2016, the district court certified several questions to the Iowa Supreme Court 
regarding the legal nature of the drainage districts. Bd. of Water Works Trs. v. Sac Cty. Bd. 
of Supervisors, No. 5:15-cv-04020-MWB (N.D. Iowa Jan. 11, 2016) (order certifying 
questions to the Iowa Supreme Court). Litigation of claims related to this issue is stayed 
pending reply. Bd. of Water Works Trs., No. 5:15-cv-04020-MWB (N.D. Iowa Jan. 19, 
2016) (order on motion to stay district court proceedings pending certification of questions 
to the Iowa Supreme Court). Courts have consistently found that water utilities have 
property interests in their source waters. See, e.g., City of Greenville v. Syngenta Crop 
Prot., Inc. (Syngenta I), 756 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1011 (S.D. Ill. 2010) (“[P]laintiffs . . . have 
rights to possess water from their raw water sources in order to use the raw water to 
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In City of Greenville v. Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc., a class of 1,930 
drinking water providers bypassed agricultural polluters and brought their 
claim directly to Syngenta, the producer of the herbicide atrazine.304 The 
plaintiffs in the suit alleged that Syngenta had sold atrazine to farmers 
“knowing it had great potential to run off of crop land and into bodies of 
water, including the bodies of water from which water providers like the 
plaintiffs draw their raw water” and asserted causes of action for trespass, 
public nuisance, and negligence.305 The parties settled the case for $105 
million, to cover plaintiffs’ costs to test for, monitor, and treat atrazine in their 
water sources.306 
One potential limitation on these suits is state right-to-farm laws, which 
protect agricultural lands from nuisance suits.307 Particularly in regions with 
more recently established public water utilities, statutory right-to-farm laws 
may limit the effectiveness of nuisance suits. These laws codify first-in-time 
common law nuisance principles, creating a complete defense to nuisance 
where the farm was in operation prior to the initiation of the plaintiff’s 
property right.308 Although these statutes have been tested, for the most part, 
in the context of residential housing development, it seems likely that they 
may also curtail nuisance suits where a newer water utility, or an older water 
utility cultivating a newer source of drinking water, attempts to sue a 
preexisting farm.309 
                                                                                                                     
provide finished, potable water to the public.”). While this Article was being finalized for 
print, the Iowa Supreme Court issued an opinion answering the certified questions 
concluding, among other things, that Iowa irrigation drainage districts are immune from 
suit for the state common law and constitutional claims, and that the Board of Water Works 
does not have a protectable property interest. Bd. of Water Works Trs. v. Sac Cty. Bd. of 
Supervisors, No. 16-0076, 2017 WL 382402 (Iowa Jan. 27, 2017). 
 304 City of Greenville v. Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. (Syngenta II), 904 F. Supp. 2d 902, 
904, 907–08 (S.D. Ill. 2012) (approving the settlement and authorizing attorney’s fees for 
class counsel); see also supra notes 110–13 and accompanying text (describing the 
problem of atrazine contamination). 
 305 Syngenta I, 756 F. Supp. 2d at 1004. Plaintiffs also brought a strict liability for 
manufacturing claim under Indiana law, but that claim was dismissed. Id. at 1009–10. 
 306 Syngenta II, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 905. 
 307 See Terence J. Centner, Governments and Unconstitutional Takings: When Do 
Right-to-Farm Laws Go Too Far?, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 87, 87–88 (2006). 
 308 Id. at 95–98. 
 309 Id. app. 1 (listing right to farm statutes by state); Margaret Rosso Grossman & 
Thomas G. Fischer, Protecting the Right to Farm: Statutory Limits on Nuisance Actions 
Against the Farmer, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 95, 98; Alexander A. Reinert, Note, The Right to 
Farm: Hog-Tied and Nuisance-Bound, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1694, 1694–95 (1998); see also 
Dalzell v. Country View Family Farms, LLC, No. 1:09-cv-1567-WTL-MJD, 2012 WL 
4052263, at *1–2 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 13, 2012) (holding that the feedlot was protected by the 
right-to-farm despite the fact that the residential neighbors moved in before the farm was 
converted to a pig feedlot), aff’d, 517 F. App’x 518 (7th Cir. 2013) (mem.). 
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5. Some Conclusions 
These litigation options can provide some relief for water utilities. Indeed, 
in certain circumstances, they could present a complete solution for individual 
water utilities seeking to add source water cleanup to their safe drinking water 
arsenals. From a systemic perspective, litigation may be its most effective in 
circumstances where utilities are able to identify a defendant or class of 
defendants other than farmers themselves. For instance, in City of Tulsa v. 
Tyson Foods Inc., the city sued not individual poultry producers, but Tyson 
Foods and several other companies that were contracting for poultry 
production.310 These companies are in a position to change poultry raising 
practices on large numbers of farms by altering the terms of their production 
contracts. Likewise, in City of Greenville v. Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc., 
the class sued Syngenta, the atrazine manufacturer, rather than individual 
farmers who had applied atrazine to their crops.311 Finally, in Board of Water 
Works v. Sac County Board of Supervisors, the city sued a series of drainage 
districts rather than individual farmers.312 These types of defendants offer not 
only deeper pockets but also avenues for more comprehensive solutions. 
Further, shifting liability to corporations such as Tyson Foods reduces the 
equity concerns that might follow from shifting liability to individual 
farmers.313 
But litigation by no means constitutes a comprehensive solution to the 
problems described in Part II.A, above. For many water utilities, no 
appropriate cause of action will be available. For others, litigation is an 
unappealing option. It is a solution with large upfront costs, potentially 
significant delays from detection of a contaminant to implementation of a 
clean up plan, and no guarantee of success, particularly with more creative 
litigation strategies. Even if litigation would ultimately be less expensive and 
more effective in the long term, a water utility seeking to come into 
compliance with federal drinking water standards as quickly as possible may 
nevertheless prefer to upgrade its treatment and filtration infrastructure. In 
other words, because litigation may take many years, a utility may prefer to 
invest in infrastructure rather than risk a lengthy term of noncompliance with 
federal standards. 
                                                                                                                     
 310 City of Tulsa v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1297 (N.D. Okla. 2003) 
(concluding that the defendants were vicariously liable for any trespass or nuisance created 
by their growers “because they were aware that in the ordinary course of doing the contract 
work, a trespass or nuisance was likely to result”), vacated pursuant to settlement (July 16, 
2003). 
 311 Syngenta I, 756 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1004, 1110–11 (S.D. Ill. 2010). 
 312 See Bd. of Water Works Complaint, supra note 4, ¶ 1. 
 313 See supra notes 252–54 and accompanying text (explaining the challenges of 
shifting costs and responsibility to farmers when farmers have little control over their 
production practices and when farmers are price takers). 
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For most utilities, litigation is also beyond the scope of their usual 
activities; in other words, it may not be an option on the table because it is not 
something in which utilities have expertise. This hesitation to engage in 
litigation parallels the hesitation, described above, for water utilities to sink 
resources into source water protection.314 Ultimately, water utilities are in the 
technocratic business of end-of-line cleanup.  
Worse, the interplay between the Clean Water Act and the SDWA pits 
cities against agricultural areas and residential communities against farmers.315 
Where water utilities do choose to pursue source water cleanup, some may 
enter into cooperative relationships with their rural hinterlands, but others will 
take a more antagonistic path. This antagonism perpetuates the perception of 
an urban/rural dichotomy and obscures the mutually dependent relationship 
between the two that is the basis of a healthy food system.316 Either a 
comprehensive protection for source water must come from other actors in the 
system, or the fundamental mission and structure of water utilities must be 
changed.  
B. Legal Reforms 
A strong and swift fix to this problem requires a suite of state and 
congressional actions. Although many of the following proposals are beyond 
political reach, some are more realistic. Thus this Part presents both an ideal 
fix and some practical second bests.  
These solutions each function within existing regulatory frameworks but 
the overarching goal is a shift to a systems based approach to water 
management which recognizes not only that watersheds, the fundamental unit 
water systems, do not align well with political jurisdictions, but also that water 
is both an input and an output functioning within a closed system.317 Any 
                                                                                                                     
 314 See supra notes 207–09 and accompanying text (hypothesizing that water utility 
professional expertise in treatment and filtration helps create path dependency). 
 315 The Des Moines Water Works litigation is itself an example of this, and it is not the 
only one. The cities of Waco, Texas and Tulsa, Oklahoma have also used litigation against 
its neighboring agricultural region as a tool to achieve cleaner drinking water. See supra 
notes 302–06 and accompanying text (describing this litigation). In an inverse example, the 
town of Hunter, New York sued New York City in a dispute over New York City’s 
extrajurisdictional exercise of watershed control. Town of Hunter v. City of New York, 
853 N.Y.S.2d 387, 388 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (holding that recreation restrictions on town 
water bodies were invalid because the New York City Department of Environmental 
Protection had failed to seek prior approval from the State Department of Health as 
required by state law). 
 316 WILLIAM CRONON, NATURE’S METROPOLIS: CHICAGO AND THE GREAT WEST, at 
xiv–xv (Norton paperback ed. 1992). 
 317 Calls for watershed level resource management are common in the natural 
resources literature. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 7, at 855; Keith H. Hirokawa, Driving 
Local Governments to Watershed Governance, 42 ENVTL. L. 157 (2012) (discussing the 
importance and benefits of implementing watershed planning and management at the local 
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regulatory structure that looks only at one aspect of that system is necessarily 
incomplete.  
The call for reform here thus draws on architect Hillary Brown’s 
characterization of “next generation infrastructure”: “[w]hereas the legacy of 
industrial-era infrastructure is one of independent, single-purpose assets and 
‘non-reimbursed,’ or one-way flows, post-industrial solutions are modeled on 
the multifunctional, closed-loop exchanges characteristic of natural 
ecosystems. . . . [T]he first principle of the post-industrial paradigm: systems 
should be multipurpose, interconnected, and, ideally, synergistic.”318  
In the drinking water contexts, this means maximizing the benefits of 
infrastructure investment by focusing on “soft-path” water systems that 
“capture, store, treat, and re-utilize stormwater runoff at or near the site of use” 
and “rely on the movement of water through streambeds, plant material, and/or 
soil, where living organisms remove sediments and metabolize 
(‘bioremediate’) impurities, filtering and adsorbing [sic] pollutant molecules 
such as phosphates and nitrogen.”319 In other words, every farm could be its 
own wastewater manager and recycler. Or, to the extent this is inefficient or 
cost prohibitive, water utilities can facilitate development of regional soft-path 
water systems that provide both clean drinking water and generate other 
benefits including clean irrigation water, aquatic habitats, and recreational 
opportunities. 
1. CWA Amendment: Expanded NPDES Permitting 
Here, this Article joins the call for a rollback of the Clean Water Act’s 
agricultural exceptions.320 Application of the NPDES permit program could 
bring significant relief to water utilities and to particularly burdened 
ratepayers. The easiest way to do this would be to change the definition of 
point source to include at least some agricultural activities, particularly those 
that resemble point sources. Many forms of irrigation return flows and field 
drainage systems channelize both irrigation and stormwater runoff, creating 
                                                                                                                     
level); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity, 
and Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189, 190–92 (2002); J.B. Ruhl et al., Proposal for a 
Model State Watershed Management Act, 33 ENVTL. L. 929 (2003) (proposing a model 
watershed management act that would rely on a multi-tiered system of governance and 
state-level watershed management initiatives). 
 318 HILLARY BROWN, NEXT GENERATION INFRASTRUCTURE: PRINCIPLES FOR POST-
INDUSTRIAL PUBLIC WORKS 18 (2014). Brown offers two basic paths to implementing this 
principle: (1) “colocation,” for instance, colocating multiple utilities in a single ditch to 
achieve efficiency; and (2) “coupling,” which refers to “symbiotic exchanges across 
different infrastructural systems, whereby output from one system supports the functions of 
another.” Id. at 18–19, 32.  
 319 Id. at 70–71. 
 320 See supra notes 8–9 (citing numerous sources). 
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the potential for measuring pollution outputs, and, if necessary, for installing 
on farm runoff filtration systems.321  
Although many criticize pollution permitting systems, under both the 
CWA and other critical environmental statutes such as the Clean Air Act, as 
inflexible and outdated regulatory mechanisms that should not be expanded, a 
well-designed permitting program for farms could learn from these flaws.322 
Removing the agriculture exemption would subject millions of farms to the 
NPDES program but would not necessarily require that the EPA and state 
environmental agencies issue millions of new permits. Instead, relying on the 
general permitting power, the EPA and state agencies could categorize farms 
based on relevant factors such as size, crop type, regional hydrology, and 
proximity to drinking water sources.323 The advantage of general permits is 
that they do not require each farm to apply for an individual permit, thus 
saving farmers the onerous task of drafting applications and state 
environmental agencies the time consuming burden of separately evaluating 
each application.324 Issuing category-wide general permits for these 
categories, EPA could impose permit conditions that draw from the Agency’s 
existing best management practices.325 These conditions would rely on EPA’s 
authority to issue process rather than performance standards.326 The Agency 
might also carve out certain types of low risk farms.327 
                                                                                                                     
 321 Changing farming practices by reducing inputs (fertilizers and pesticides) and 
building in natural filtration through field buffer zones would likely be preferable to runoff 
filtration, but the existence of a measurable effluent point also facilitates measurement for 
compliance.  
 322 See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 
CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 27–38 (2001) (critiquing command and control regulation for its 
inflexibility and inefficiency). 
 323 Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1380–82 (D.C. Cir. 1977) 
(explaining how general permits might be used to overcome challenges of applying 
NPDES to agriculture). 
 324 See Eric Biber & J.B. Ruhl, The Permit Power Revisited: The Theory and Practice 
of Regulatory Permits in the Administrative State, 64 DUKE L.J. 133, 181–82 (2014) 
(“General permits are a way of reducing the fixed costs of permitting by making those 
costs less significant without necessarily relaxing the underlying substantive regulatory 
standards.”). 
 325 See supra notes 157–61 and accompanying text (describing EPA’s existing work 
developing best practice guidelines). 
 326 Nat. Res. Def. Council, 568 F.2d at 1380 (concluding that where effluent limitations 
were not enforceable, the EPA could impose process rather than performance standards). 
Although performance standards might be preferable because they would give farmers 
more flexibility, they may not always be feasible since non-point source pollution can be 
difficult to measure.  
 327 Launching such a program would impose significant transition costs on farms and 
could force some farms out of business. See generally Bruce R. Huber, Transition Policy in 
Environmental Law, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 91 (2011) (describing various types of 
transition relief in environmental law); Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs of Legal 
Change, 49 UCLA L. REV. 789 (2002) (laying out the problem of transition costs and 
arguing that they ought to be taken into account in assessing merits of new programs). 
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The advantage of this type of reform is that it responds to the full scope of 
agricultural water pollution, not just that affecting drinking water supplies. 
This kind of Clean Water Act amendment is, however, unlikely to occur in the 
near future. Current fights over the scope of EPA’s CWA jurisdiction suggest 
concern in Congress for any expansion of the Agency’s authority, particularly 
with regard to agriculture. EPA’s efforts to redefine “waters of the United 
States” (those waters subject to CWA regulation) have led to numerous 
congressional hearings and several proposed bills to contract EPA’s 
authority.328 Although CWA amendment should remain a part of reform 
discussion as a long-term goal, it is not politically realistic in the near term. 
2. SDWA Amendment 
SDWA reform boasts two political advantages over CWA reform. First, 
reforms need not impose additional express burdens either on drinking water 
utilities or on nonpoint sources. Instead, the proposed reforms empower 
drinking water utilities without singling out any type of polluter in particular. 
By contrast, compare this proposal to the CWA amendment discussed in the 
next Part, which would require eliminating the CWA’s express carve out for 
agricultural interests. Second, the safety of drinking water is a concrete and 
salient concern. Even where agricultural interests oppose reforms, drinking 
water safety might rally support in a more concentrated way than is available 
in a generic fight between agricultural and environmental interests.  
Amending SDWA could provide comprehensive relief for burdened water 
utilities and ratepayers. Two changes in particular could help shift the default 
from end-of-line clean up to source water protection and break the technocratic 
hold on SDWA implementation.  
The first would build on the existing source water assessment program and 
mandate that states develop and implement federally enforceable source water 
protection programs. While leaving flexibility for states to design different 
kinds of programs, such an amendment would mandate that states meet certain 
minimum federal requirements, including identifying vulnerable areas and 
creating appropriate land use, fertilizer, and pesticide restrictions in those 
                                                                                                                     
Some transition relief might be appropriate in this context but should come primarily in the 
form of giving regulated entities a reasonable amount of time to come into compliance. A 
good model might be that used in the Food Safety Modernization Act, which tiers 
compliance deadlines based on farm size. See 21 U.S.C. § 350h(b)(3) (2012). 
 328 See generally CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43943, EPA AND THE 
ARMY CORPS’ “WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES” RULE: CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE AND 
OPTIONS (2016), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43943.pdf [https://perma.cc/GYK4-
GSCA] (summarizing political tug-of-war over the rule). In the final days of the Obama 
Administration, Congress passed and President Obama vetoed a resolution rescinding the 
WOTUS rule. Timothy Cama, Obama Vetoes GOP Attempt to Block Water Rule, HILL 
(Jan. 19, 2016), http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/266395-obama-vetoes-gop-
attempt-to-block-water-rule [https://perma.cc/9GG6-VM29]. At the moment of this 
writing, the rule remains on the books. 
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areas. The amendment would also require that water utilities develop 
enforceable source water protection plans and provide funding to support those 
plans.  
This amendment would shift SDWA priorities from filtration and 
treatment to source water protection as the first line of defense against 
drinking water contamination, continuing a trend that started with the 1996 
SDWA amendments. Although those amendments provide few robust 
protections, they recognized the importance of source water protection.329 The 
primary result of the 1996 amendments was to require states to gather data 
regarding source water. After twenty years of data collection, the time is ripe 
for putting that data to regulatory use. Such a shift would have benefits beyond 
agriculture and would allow water utilities and states to consider regulatory 
approaches for other sources of both point and nonpoint source pollution.  
This proposed amendment would require EPA to set sourcewater 
protection targets for each state based on an assessment of existing data on 
noncompliance with federal drinking water standards and source of water 
contamination. Each state would then be required to submit a federally 
enforceable source water protection plan.330 These plans could include a broad 
range of protection tools such as funding for land acquisition and easements, 
development restrictions in particularly sensitive watershed areas, fertilizer 
and pesticide application restrictions and/or permitting requirements, green 
payments for installation of buffer zones between cropland and waterways, 
and technical support for farmers and other nonpoint source polluters.331 
A second critical change would be to extend SDWA imminent and 
substantial endangerment litigation authority to states, water utilities, and, 
perhaps most importantly, to ratepayers. This type of suit is arguably the most 
powerful of the litigation options described in Part III.A, and expanding its 
reach would allow ratepayers to take action where the EPA was unable to do 
so. Extending the right to ratepayers in particular, and not just to water 
utilities, could bypass the technocratic bias of water utilities. Allowing 
ratepayers to sue creates a parallel to NPDES CWA citizen suits, empowering 
communities to protect themselves from threats to public health.332 
                                                                                                                     
 329 H.R. REP. NO. 104-741, at 3–4 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (“[M]ore effective protection of 
public health requires . . . enhanced protection of source waters of public water systems”). 
 330 This would parallel the state implementation plan process under the Clean Air Act. 
See supra notes 157–69 and accompanying text. If a state chose not to develop a plan, EPA 
could develop one instead.  
 331 Many states do some combination of these things already. See, e.g., RIBAUDO ET 
AL., supra note 22, at 20 tbl.1-5 (identifying practices already in place in each state). This 
program would push states to accelerate these activities, prod recalcitrant states into action, 
and create the opportunity for federal enforcement. 
 332 Plaintiffs in such suits might face considerable evidence gathering hurdles because 
they would need to identify source farms, prove that water contamination from those farms 
was reaching drinking water sources, and prove that those levels of contamination were 
causing endangerment to human health. See supra note 238. 
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3. Farm Bill Amendment 
Passed about every five years since the Great Depression, the farm bill is 
omnibus federal legislation governing federal farm policy.333 Its major farm-
related components are commodity programs (providing subsidy support for 
commodity crop growers), conservation programs (providing funding to 
support improved environmental practices), crop insurance, and research 
support.334 The multibillion dollar bill identifies federal priorities for the 
agricultural industry and plays a critical role in shaping farm practices both 
through the incentives subsidies create and through research and education 
programs.  
Although the precise relationship between farm bill spending and 
agriculture’s environmental impacts is not well understood, scholars agree that 
such a relationship exists.335 And both environmental harms and benefits can 
be attributed to its various programs. For instance, modern programs aimed at 
reducing soil erosion likely played a role in a reduction in erosion levels in the 
1980s and 1990s.336 This Article calls for two drinking-water targeted farm 
bill reforms that would also generate other collateral benefits. 
a. Cross-Compliance (Conditional Subsidies) 
Cross-compliance, or conditioning receipt of farm subsidies on 
compliance with conservation requirements, has long been a feature of the 
farm subsidy system. Soil conservation, i.e. prevention of soil erosion, has 
been a central goal of the federal farm policy since the first farm bill was 
passed during the Great Depression.337 Since 1985, the farm bill has 
conditioned receipt of commodity subsidies on compliance with basic 
“sodbuster” and “swampbuster” programs designed to limit farming on 
“highly erodible land” and to prevent future conversion of wetlands for farm 
                                                                                                                     
 333 See RENÉE JOHNSON & JIM MONKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22131, WHAT IS 
THE FARM BILL? 1, 3 fig.1 (2014). 
 334 Id. at 2. The statute also includes the supplement nutrition assistance program, 
previously referred to as food stamps, and various other nutrition programs. Id.  
 335 See generally, e.g., George B. Frisvold, How Federal Farm Programs Affect Water 
Use, Quality, and Allocation Among Sectors, WATER RESOURCES RES., Nov. 25, 2004, 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1029/2003WR002753/epdf [https://perma.cc/FZG9-
AUQL]. 
 336 RIBAUDO ET AL., supra note 22, at 7 (crediting the Conservation Reserve Program 
and Conservation Compliance Programs and estimating that these programs may generate 
anywhere from several hundred million to several billion dollars’ worth of benefits over 
their lives). 
 337 See generally Conservation Programs – An Overview, NAT’L AGRIC. L. CTR., 
http://nationalaglawcenter.org/overview/conservation-programs/ [https://perma.cc/BNS8-
JM85]. 
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production respectively.338 In 2014, cross-compliance requirements were 
extended to participation in federal crop insurance programs, which are 
surpassing direct payments and counter-cyclical payments as the primary farm 
safety net.339  
Although the current requirements are minimal, requiring just an adequate 
“soil conservation plan” for sodbuster compliance, conditioning subsidies is 
theoretically a very powerful tool. For instance, under the Common 
Agricultural Policy in the European Union, cross-compliance includes a broad 
range of substantive obligations.340 To be eligible for subsidies, farmers must 
adhere to more than a dozen mandatory statutory management requirements 
and must maintain “good agricultural and environmental condition[s],” which 
are otherwise voluntary.341 Provisions include mandatory soil cover 
requirements, field boundary requirements, and restrictions on spreading 
fertilizers (including location restrictions and volume caps) in designated 
nitrate vulnerable zones.342 These conditions, among other regulatory 
strategies, are partly responsible for the EU’s achievement of ammonia 
reduction targets.343  
Carefully targeted cross-compliance requirements could protect drinking 
water sources. Such provisions might include fertilizer application limits set 
by region, manure application limits, prohibition on fertilizer and manure 
application in periods directly before predicted rainfall, and field buffer zone 
requirements. Simple, and often low cost, changes to farming practices could 
significantly reduce drinking water contamination and have collateral benefits 
for aquatic ecosystems and other water use values.  
As with the congressional actions described above, these kinds of reforms 
are not immediately politically feasible. The effort to extend current cross-
compliance to crop insurance was a difficult and barely won political battle. 
But, particularly as farmers begin to feel the consequences of climate change, 
green farm bill programs, which have the added benefit of making farms 
themselves more resilient to severe weather, may become more palatable. 
                                                                                                                     
 338 MEGAN STUBBS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43504, CONSERVATION PROVISIONS IN 
THE 2014 FARM BILL (P.L. 113-79) 13–17 (2014) (explaining conservation compliance); 
FOOD & WATER WATCH & PUB. HEALTH INST., supra note 241, at 5–7 (documenting the 
modern history of farm subsidy programs).  
 339 STUBBS, supra note 338, at 14. 
 340 Cross Compliance, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/direct-
support/cross-compliance/index_en.htm [https://perma.cc/YK6L-F3CK] (last updated July 
6, 2016). 
 341 Id. 
 342 Id. 
 343 Agriculture – Ammonia Emission Statistics, EUROSTAT STAT. EXPLAINED, 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Agriculture_-_ammonia_emissio 
n_statistics [https://perma.cc/SPK6-5XT6] (last modified Oct. 19, 2016). Ammonia is a 
common agricultural air and water pollutant. See id. As a water pollutant, it contributes to 
eutrophication. Id. 
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b. Green Payment Programs 
Not all of the above proposed subsidy conditions are low cost. For many 
farms with small profit margins, compliance costs with above programs could 
be the difference between economic viability and bankruptcy.344 A well-
designed green payment program could cover some of these additional costs 
making the above programs more politically palatable and preserving farm-
size diversity, which is essential to rural economic development.345 
This approach draws on the ecological characterization of “farms as 
housing the natural capital capable of providing a stream of diverse good[s] 
and services, including ecosystem services such as increased biodiversity, 
carbon sequestration, pollination, groundwater recharge,” and, importantly for 
this discussion, “improvement of water quality.”346 Rather than identifying 
farmers as polluters that must be reigned in, the green payment framework 
characterizers farmers as partners in a mutual endeavor to produce both 
adequate food and fiber and environmental benefits.347  
Under the existing Conservation Stewardship Program, the USDA’s 
Natural Resources Conservation Service makes payments to farmers for 
adopting a range of conversation practices on working farmlands.348 This 
program was launched in 2002,349 and reflected a change in policy from older 
conservation programs that paid farmers simply to take land out of 
                                                                                                                     
 344 Many farms operate on very low profit margins. See, e.g., U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC IMPACTS—STANDARDS FOR THE GROWING, HARVESTING, 
PACKING AND HOLDING OF PRODUCE FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION 313–18 (Aug. 2013), 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Food/FoodSafety/FSMA/UCM334116.pdf [https://perma.c 
c/XY6Q-F8D2] (identifying the financial burden of new food safety rules for farms and 
finding that such rules may force many farmers to supplement revenue with off-farm 
employment). 
 345 See generally DOUGLAS JACKSON-SMITH ET AL., AGREE, ASSESSING THE IMPACTS 
OF FEDERAL FARM BILL PROGRAMS ON RURAL COMMUNITIES (Apr. 2013), 
http://www.foodandagpolicy.org/sites/default/files/AGreeFarmBill%20Programs%20on%2
0Rural%20Devlp%20Apr2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/2V86-HLLC]. 
 346 J.B. Ruhl, Agriculture and Ecosystem Services: Strategies for State and Local 
Governments, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 424, 426 (2008). “Ecosystem services are 
economically valuable benefits humans derive from ecological resources directly, such as 
storm surge mitigation provided by coastal dunes and marshes, and indirectly, such as 
nutrient cycling that supports crop production.” Id. at 426 n.10. 
 347 Many might object to green payment programs as a deviation from the polluter 
pays principle. E.g., Jim Chen, Get Green or Get Out: Decoupling Environmental from 
Economic Objectives in Agricultural Regulation, 48 OKLA. L. REV. 333, 344 (1995). 
 348 STUBBS, supra note 338, at 8. 
 349 Conservation Stewardship Program: Rewarding Farmers for Adopting and 
Managing Advanced Conservation Systems, NAT’L SUSTAINABLE AGRIC. COALITION, 
http://sustainableagriculture.net/publications/grassrootsguide/conservation-environment/co 
nservation-stewardship-program/ [https://perma.cc/M367-LYC3] (last updated Oct. 2016). 
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production.350 Local and regional USDA offices administer the program, 
allocating funds on the basis of local and national funding priorities, which are 
set annually.351  
Without any congressional action, the Natural Resources Conservation 
Service could prioritize funding farming practices that would protect drinking 
water sources. The Agency could also direct funds to particularly vulnerable 
watersheds. The scope of the program’s reach is, however, extremely limited 
by its funding.352 The 2014 Farm Bill cut conservation funding for the first 
time since it became a regular feature of the modern farm bill in 1985.353 
Expanded funding, if it were to become politically feasible, would expand the 
program’s reach.354  
The USDA also manages several conservation easement programs aimed 
at protecting farmland and wetlands from development.355 Through both 
programs, the USDA funds easement purchases; the farmer receives an influx 
of cash, and the development rights are then held in perpetuity either by the 
USDA itself or by a state partner program. The easement programs present an 
opportunity to generate source water protection. First, the USDA could 
condition farmland easement purchase on adoption of a narrow set of targeted 
conservation measures. Second, it could set proximity to drinking water 
sources as a priority for selecting wetlands for protection.356  
i. Developing State Watershed Programs 
States have enormous flexibility both within SDWA and CWA 
frameworks and beyond them to develop creative approaches to watershed 
protection and agricultural water pollution mitigation. Many states have taken 
advantage of this flexibility to develop creative approaches to watershed 
                                                                                                                     
 350 The Conservation Reserve Program paid farmers to take land out of production, 
and, while the program still exists, it has been deemphasized. STUBBS, supra note 338, at 
9–10. 
 351 Conservation Stewardship Program – Payment for Performance, U.S. DEP’T 
AGRIC., https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/detailfull/national/programs/financial/c 
sp/?cid=nrcs143_008316 [https://perma.cc/3NBG-3XMN]. 
 352 See Agricultural Water Enhancement Program, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., 
http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/programs/financial/awep/ [https:// 
perma.cc/QXK2-LVB2] (“The 2008 Farm Bill provided $73 million for fiscal year 2009, 
$73 million for fiscal year 2010, $74 million for fiscal year 2011, and $60 million for fiscal 
year 2012 and each year thereafter for AWEP.”). 
 353 STUBBS, supra note 338, at 1. 
 354 Cf. Ruhl, supra note 346, at 428–29 (noting slow movement at the federal level on 
these programs and calling on states to implement them directly). 
 355 See STUBBS, supra note 338, at 9–12 (discussing agricultural easements). 
 356 See Agricultural Conservation Easement Program, 7 C.F.R. § 1468.32 (2016) 
(describing prioritization process). 
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protection.357 Other states are moving in the other direction, providing more 
robust protections for agricultural and insulation from potential regulation, 
such as Missouri recently amended its constitution to guarantee a right to 
farm.358 Although the scope of this protection is extremely vague, it is very 
possible that it will significantly limit any state or local level efforts to curtail 
agricultural water pollution. 
But, at the state level, affected water utilities and municipalities may be 
more effective at lobbying for source water protection.359 And, at the state 
level, contamination events may generate adequate public salience to create 
the political will for action. For instance, the recent microcystin contamination 
in Toledo, Ohio led to several actions at the state level including fertilizer 
applicator licensing requirements and restrictions on application timing.360 The 
high-profile and tragic Flint, Michigan water crisis, though not directly related 
to agricultural contamination, has also generated significant attention for aging 
water infrastructure and for the need for technical support for local water 
systems.361 In Iowa, a heavily agricultural state, more than half of state 
residents support the Des Moines Water Works lawsuit.362 
A few other examples of state programs help illustrate the range of 
options. In California, the Port-Cologne Water Quality Control Act, the state’s 
version of the Clean Water Act, sets up a three-tiered approach to nonpoint 
source pollution.363 At Tier 1, contributors to nonpoint source pollution 
engage in “self-determined cooperation” while at Tiers 2 and 3, polluters are 
subject to effluent limitations.364 In practice, farms and dairies have long held 
regulatory waivers under this program, but in the last fifteen years, these 
waivers have come under attack, and are being replaced with more robust 
conditional waivers.365  
                                                                                                                     
 357 See CRAIG & NOTO, supra note 167, at 7 (surveying programs in all fifty states and 
finding five states with robust programs, nineteen with some degree of mandatory 
requirements, and many others with voluntary programs). 
 358 MO. CONST. art. I, § 35 (“[T]he right of farmers and ranchers to engage in farming 
and ranching practices shall be forever guaranteed . . . .”). 
 359 As the NRDC has noted, “[t]he argument that source water protection is beyond a 
utility’s control is simply not valid; water utilities can aggressively pursue polluters of their 
water supply through both political and legal means,” including pushing for federal and 
state legislation to fund acquisition of land, and pushing for federal and state pollution 
controls. OLSON, supra note 42, at 42. 
 360 See supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text. 
 361 See, e.g., Coral Davenport, With Nod to Flint Crisis, Senate Weighs a $9 Billion 
Water Infrastructure Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/0 
8/us/politics/senate-water-bill.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/5PSU-HJ7H]. 
 362 See Eller, supra note 41. 
 363 CAL. WATER CODE § 13369 (West 2009 & Supp. 2016). 
 364 See CRAIG & NOTO, supra note 167, at 24 (providing a detailed description of the 
California program). 
 365 See OLSON, supra note 66, at 55–59. Under more recent law, regional water quality 
control boards must reconsider whether these waivers remain in the public interest. In 
1999, the California legislature passed S.B. 390, which caused all agricultural waivers to 
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In Kentucky, the Agriculture Water Quality Act “requires farmers with 10 
or more contiguous acres develop and implement an Individual Plan to address 
water pollution, consisting of [best management practices] to prevent 
pollution.”366 The Act establishes a monitoring program to be used to identify 
regions where agriculture is contributing to water quality problems; in those 
regions, compliance with plans becomes mandatory.367 The statute only 
provides for enforcement, however, where a farmer “receive[d] written 
notification of documented water pollution and of the agriculture water quality 
plan needed to prevent water pollution, and is provided technical assistance, 
and financial assistance when possible . . . but still refuses or fails to comply 
with the requirements of the agriculture water quality plan.”368 This 
enforcement provision allows the state to pursue enforcement when necessary 
but ensures that farmers have support in achieving compliance. 
                                                                                                                     
expire in 2003, forcing the Regional Water Quality Control Boards, which are responsible 
for implementation of the Porter-Cologne Water Quality Act, to reevaluate each waiver. Id. 
The statute directed that waivers could be reissued only on a finding that they remained in 
the public interest. CAL. WATER CODE § 13269(a)(1) (West 2009). The Regional Water 
Quality Control Boards in California’s main agricultural regions replaced those complete 
waivers with conditional waivers that imposed monitoring and reporting requirements. See 
generally, e.g., CENT. COAST REGION, CAL. REG’L WATER QUALITY CONTROL BD., 
MONITORING AND REPORTING PROGRAM NO. R3-2004-0117 FOR DISCHARGERS ENROLLED 
UNDER CONDITIONAL WAIVERS OF WASTE DISCHARGE REQUIREMENTS FOR DISCHARGES 
FROM IRRIGATED LANDS (July 2004), http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/centralcoast/board_de 
cisions/adopted_orders/2004/2004_0117_mrp_conditional_ag_waiver.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/37VZ-UHRG]. Finding these requirements inadequate to curb nitrate contamination, some 
of these Regional Boards have added additional requirements. For instance, the Central 
Coast Region updated its agricultural order, requiring that “[d]ischargers . . . implement, 
and where appropriate update or improve, management practices, which may include local 
or regional control or treatment practices and changes in farming practices to effectively 
control discharges, meet water quality standards and achieve compliance with this Order.” 
CENT. COAST REGION, CAL. REG’L WATER QUALITY CONTROL BD., ORDER NO. R3-2012-
0011, CONDITIONAL WAIVER OF WASTE DISCHARGE REQUIREMENTS FOR DISCHARGES FROM 
IRRIGATED LANDS ¶ 10 (Mar. 15, 2012), http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/centralcoast/water 
_issues/programs/ag_waivers/docs/ag_oder/final_agorder_atta_032612.pdf [https://perma.c 
c/3U9H-PJA6]. Shortly after this Order was issued, however, agricultural organizations 
appealed the Order to the California State Water Resources Control Board, which 
weakened some of its requirements. See Monterey Coastkeeper v. Cal. State Water Res. 
Control Bd., No. 34-2012-80001324, slip op. at 1–2 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 15, 2015). 
Several environmental groups challenged the revised order and a California Superior Court 
judge recently ruled that the revised order “lacks sufficient measures to meet the . . . water 
quality objectives.” Id. at 36. The State Board is currently considering revisions. See CENT. 
COAST REGION, CAL. REG’L WATER QUALITY CONTROL BD., NOTICE OF OPPORTUNITY FOR 
PUBLIC COMMENT AND NOTICE OF PUBLIC HEARING (Dec. 23, 2016), 
http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/centralcoast/board_decisions/tentative_orders/2017/2017_002rev
ised_public_notice_dec23_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/QV5Q-8H4Q]. 
 366 See CRAIG & NOTO, supra note 167, at 33. 
 367 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.71-120 (LexisNexis 2012). 
 368 Id. § 224.71-100(2). 
2016] DRINKING WATER PROTECTION 1259 
Successful state programs, particularly those that manage to strike a 
balance between the interests of water drinkers and the economic interests of 
farmers, may serve as models for other states and ultimately for federal 
legislation. 
ii. Research Support and Education 
Last, but certainly not least, research and education have long been critical 
tools in federal farm policy.369 For farmers, information support can help 
overcome challenges associated with modifying farming practices to reduce 
water pollution. For instance, through recent research at the University of 
California, Davis, scientists have developed cheap field tests to monitor nitrate 
levels.370 Existing methods were expensive and required lab analysis; cheaper 
testing allows farmers to monitor field nitrate levels and reduce application of 
additional fertilizers when levels are high.371 
Likewise, for water utility professionals, research and education on source 
water protection strategies might help break the cycle of reliance on treatment 
and filtration. Some efforts on this front are already underway. In 2006, a 
coalition of drinking water professional associations, nonprofit organizations, 
and federal agencies formed the Source Water Collaborative, whose mission is 
“to combine the strengths and tools of a diverse set of member organizations 
to act now, and protect drinking water sources for generations to come.”372 
The Collaborative provides a variety of resources including maps, data, and 
access to information about various source water protection efforts around the 
country.373 Diverting additional resources toward this type of effort could 
provide support for burdened water utilities, particularly in smaller 
communities.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Agricultural nonpoint source pollution is not the only threat to drinking 
water safety. Aging infrastructure and other types of pollution also raise 
                                                                                                                     
 369 Anne B.W. Effland, U.S. Farm Policy: The First 200 Years, AGRIC. OUTLOOK, 
Mar. 2000, at 21, 21–22, http://www.farmlandinfo.org/sites/default/files/US_Farm_Policy_ 
March_2000_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/WCK6-KEXG] (dating federal support to farms via 
research and education to the 1830s). 
 370 Timothy K. Hartz et al., On-Farm Nitrogen Tests Improve Fertilizer Efficiency, 
Protect Groundwater, CAL. AGRIC., July–Aug. 1994, at 29, 31–32 (observing that where 
tests were expensive and fertilizer was cheap farmers had little incentive to monitor nitrate 
levels, but lower cost tests can increase farmer interest in monitoring). 
 371 Id. 
 372 About the Source Water Collaborative, SOURCE WATER COLLABORATIVE, 
http://sourcewatercollaborative.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/JH4H-YZHV]. 
 373 Map of Collaborative Efforts, SOURCE WATER COLLABORATIVE, http://sourcewater 
collaborative.org/how-to-collaborate-toolkit/map/ [https://perma.cc/LP4G-5JJC]. 
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serious concerns.374 But agricultural nonpoint source pollution, and other types 
of unregulated nonpoint source pollution, generate a particular set of questions 
about who cleans up pollution and who pays for that cleanup that merit unique 
attention. This Article argues that current regulatory schemes misallocate those 
responsibilities and costs in ways that are not only inefficient and unfair but 
also undermine successful water resource management. It offers a range of 
solutions that each attempt to prioritize source water protection, shifting the 
focus from technocratic end-of-line clean up to pollution prevention. This shift 
recognizes both the ancillary benefits of prevention and the limits of end-of-
line cleanup. As engineer George W. Fuller said in 1907, “a pure water is 
better than a purified water.”375  
A focus on source water protection also fits within a broader trend among 
environmental scholars to recognize the value of systems approaches. Of 
course, water itself forms a complex natural system as it moves across the 
landscape creating interdependence between various communities for 
collective access to both clean water and enough water.376 But water is also an 
integral part of the food system, as a critical resource for agricultural 
production and as food itself.377 This lens reemphasizes the importance of a 
systems approach and the shortsightedness of reliance on end-of-line cleanup. 
                                                                                                                     
 374 OLSON, supra note 42, at 5 (“As . . . water infrastructure outlives its useful life, it 
can corrode and deteriorate, and we have witnessed the results: a nationwide epidemic of 
burst water mains, unreliable pumps and collection equipment, and aging treatment plants 
that fail to remove important contaminants.”). 
 375 Keith S. Porter, Fixing Our Drinking Water: From Field and Forest to Faucet, 23 
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 389, 398–99 (2006) (quoting George W. Fuller, Water Supply: An 
Informal Discussion of the Annual Convention, July 10th, 1907, in PURE AND WHOLESOME 
39, 44 (Am. Soc’y of Civil Eng’rs ed., 1982)) (describing the history of dominant 
approaches to clean drinking water and the shift from watershed protection to end-of-line 
cleanup at the turn of the twentieth century).  
 376 Although this Article focuses on water purity, similar concerns play out in analysis 
of water quantity. 
 377 See generally Margot J. Pollans, The Safe Drinking Water / Food Law Nexus, 32 
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 501 (2015) (arguing for the importance of treating water as food and 
evaluating its regulation through the lens of food law). 
